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PRODUCTIVITY OF LABOR
IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
SUMMARY OF METHOD AND FINDINGS
This bulletin presents results from detailed studies of aggregated
labor productivity in United States agriculture. This productivity
concept is the ratio of farm output for final use over the sum of direct
(on-farm) and indirect (off-farm) labor used for agricultural pro-
duction. Indirect labor is estimated from the amounts of money spent
by farmers for farm production requisites (capital goods and current
production inputs). Such an estimate gives an approximate measure of
the part of the nonfarm labor force that is indirectly contributing to
agricultural production.
The research reported here examines some of the effects and inter-
actions of federal support policies for agriculture and their long-run
effects on agriculture as an industry, rather than year-to-year effects
on farmers' incomes. The index of aggregated labor productivity is
specifically designed to measure the advantage to society as a whole
from changes in agriculture. This index is directly comparable with the
index of national income per worker in the national economy and
roughly comparable with the index of per capita national income; it is
therefore directly related to the welfare effects of productivity change.
Prior to the research now being reported, this type of productivity
measurement was discussed to some extent but hardly found any sig-
nificant application.
In this analysis, agriculture, together with those parts of other in-
dustries selling supplies to agriculture, is treated as one "subsystem"
in the national economic system — the "agricultural output subsystem."
This new productivity index has been computed for United States
agriculture as a whole for the years since 1919 by means of a short-
cut method. For certain benchmark years (1919, 1929, 1939, and 1954)
parallel estimates were made on the basis of detailed input-output
tables, to which an elaborate matrix-algebra procedure was applied.
The results of these matrix analyses were in good agreement with those
from the shortcut method for these same years, and the soundness of
the shortcut method was thus confirmed.
Analogous productivity measures were also computed for a number
of major commodities, using as material the annual "Farm Costs and
Returns" publications of the USDA. A modified version of the shortcut
method used in the national totals since 1919 was applied to these farm-
level data, some of which start in 1930 and others in various later years.
The index of aggregated labor productivity in United States agri-
culture shows that over the period under study, productivity in the
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agricultural subsystem (under this concept) has risen considerably
faster than in the national economy as a whole. Specifically, it is shown
that during the period since 1919, the rate of productivity increase has
not only been high, but has also been accelerating. The rate of accel-
eration since 1919 has been constant at 3.5 percent of the rate-of-
productivity increment. As a consequence, the average annual rate-of-
productivity increase rose from 1.5 percent around 1920 to about 6
percent around 1960. This acceleration is connected, above all, with
the accelerated rate of farm exodus, that in the 1950's reached the
level of 5 percent per year. The amount of indirect labor used to pro-
duce and service farm production requisites rose very moderately, from
\}/l million man-years in the 1920's to about 2 million around 1960.
During the same period direct farm labor fell from over 10 million to
4 million workers.
For years prior to 1919, detailed data for similar index numbers
have not been worked out. However, from summary information re-
ferring to decennial years from 1870 to 1910, it appears possible, but
not certain, that productivity increases since 1870 have also accelerated
at the same annual rate of 3.5 percent.
This acceleration in the productivity of agriculture may have
counterparts in other parts of the economy, but conclusive proof is
lacking so far. Productivity in the national economy as a whole has
been rising at a more steady rate; if there is any tendency toward ac-
celeration in national productivity indexes, it must be by a very low
acceleration factor. However, there are several conceptual problems
in regard to the index numbers of production in industries and services,
and it is therefore possible that a different type of analysis from those
so far applied might reveal more progress than has been estimated to
date.
The rapid rate of productivity increase in agriculture forms the
principal background to the fall in relative prices of farm products and
the welfare effects that flow from it — mainly to consumers who get
their food at lower real cost. Farmers also share in the benefits from
productivity— mainly indirectly, from the higher level of economic
well-being to which increased agricultural productivity contributes
vigorously.
Commodity-level analyses have supplied separate productivity in-
dexes for wheat, corn, soybeans, peanuts, cotton, tobacco, eggs, milk,
hogs, beef, sheep, and wool. Several of these commodities are repre-
sented by separate indexes for two or more major production areas.
The period covered by these indexes is not always the same. Some of
the series for wheat, corn, soybeans, cotton, milk, hogs, beef, sheep, and
wool begin in 1930; other series start at various later dates. Another
set of estimates for the national agricultural economy was prepared by
aggregating the commodity data.
Some of the commodity indexes show the same rate of long-term
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productivity increase as the national aggregate. Others are moving
slower, and a few even more rapidly, over the same period of years, than
the national aggregate. Several of the indexes can be interpreted as
reflecting the same rate of long-term acceleration (of 3.5 percent per
year) as the national aggregate, although with various time lags behind
or ahead of the national trend. Productivity-increase rates ahead of
the national trend are shown for New Jersey egg farms and the North-
west wheat farms. Close to the national trend are the cash-grain farms
of the Corn Belt, some cotton farms, and some dairy farms. Below the
national trend are hog farms, most dairy farms, and several cotton
farms; even more below are beef farms (both ranches and fattening
enterprises) and tobacco farms. Below the national trend also are most
wheat farms (without representing the common accelerating trend).
There may be instances where the acceleration has ceased and been
replaced by a slower rhythm of productivity increase or possibly even
a decelerating one.
Several, but not all, of the commodity series reflect the slump in
agricultural production that marked part of the early and mid-thirties.
Since moving averages have to be used to eliminate year-to-year inci-
dental variation, the start of the series is sometimes difficult to interpret
because some of the years of abnormally low output are already in-
cluded in the first moving average. Apart from this, certain periods
can be shown as characteristic of certain commodities.
Thus, productivity in wheat production recovered during the late
thirties and regained the precrisis level during the early years of World
War II. In the late war years and the early postwar years wheat pro-
ductivity stayed relatively level. It rose sharply after 1953, with signs
of a new lull around 1960. Corn productivity had a similar, but not
quite so sharp spurt up to 1944, but during the following years there
was no serious interruption in the rather steady uptrend of productivity
also continuing to about 1960. Among the cotton farms analyzed, most
had a slowdown in productivity improvement during most of the 1940's
— roughly the period when wheat production remained constant— fol-
lowed by a more or less sharp upturn, usually starting some years
earlier than in the case of wheat. Tobacco productivity showed some
improvement in the late forties (the starting years of the series),
thereafter a lull in the early to mid-fifties, and some moderate improve-
ment in subsequent years.
Milk productivity is among the smoothest series, with a steady up-
trend during most of the period, but with a lull during the war years
and the early postwar years. The series for eggs starts in 1945 and
shows one of the steadiest uptrends, at a faster rate than the national
trend. Hog productivity suffered a sharp setback in the early thirties,
then recovered rapidly and has thereafter proceeded somewhat un-
evenly, with slowdown periods first in the same period as milk and then
again for some years in the early fifties. Beef productivity increase is
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slow and uneven, with pronounced cyclical peaks around 1945 and 1955
and troughs around 1950 and close to 1960, as well as in the mid-
thirties. Sheep and wool productivity follows roughly the same pattern
with a sharp rise from the mid-thirties to the mid-forties, then a slump
centering around 1950, and thereafter a sustained sharp rise with signs
of weakening in the early sixties.
These various differences in trend can be tied in with long-term
movements in the agricultural economy. The beef cycle is an extreme
case that can be immediately recognized. Other variations in trend
can be explained in terms of wartime conditions that favored the
increased production of food grains but may have been less favorable to
milk, pork, and cotton. It is logical that wartime shortages of ma-
chinery and chemicals should have had some negative effects on several
lines of production. The rather general uptrend over most of the fifties
is related most closely to the accelerating farm exodus.
The differences in the rate of the productivity change can also be
explained in part by technical circumstances and in part by farm policy.
The slow productivity increase in tobacco production is only in part
due to technical necessity; in part at least it must be due to the partic-
ular support system applied to tobacco production that created little
incentive to substitute capital for labor. The case of beef is more
complicated. In the ranching areas, rise in productivity is hampered by
the fact that the grass-producing ability of the pastures can hardly be
improved, and the scope for substitution of capital for labor is limited.
Yet the sheep ranches have shown rapid improvement in their produc-
tivity which, admittedly, was low at the start of the period compared to
that of certain other sheep-producing countries. But the slow rise in
productivity of beef production is not confined to the ranches; it ex-
tends also to beef raising and fattening enterprises in the Corn Belt
and, to a lesser extent, to hog production in the same area, despite
the fact that these productivity indexes reflect both feed crop production
and animal husbandry. These cases reflect a late start and as yet a not
too rapid adoption of high-productive technology in animal husbandry.
Generally speaking, productivity increases are related to a down-
ward pressure on prices. A wave of productivity increases made pos-
sible a fall in the relative price of the commodity— sometimes merely
by a failure of the price to rise in times of inflation. The new price
level then became associated with a permanent readjustment of the
factors of production, particularly the substitution of capital for labor.
It is possible that federal support policies have promoted rather than
hampered these changes by making the income flow of farmers more
dependable and hence reducing the risks associated with a higher level
of cash outlays.
Some investigations were made of changes in capital intensity. The
"real capital ratio" in the sense of Joan Robinson1 (capital per worker,
*Joan Robinson, The Accumulation of Capital. London, 1956.
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as a ratio of a worker's annual earnings) in American agriculture did
not changed much over the period under study. Because conceptual
difficulties attach both to land and to farm-produced forms of capital
(such as livestock and crop inventories), the analysis was centered
around the more narrow but less controversial concept of machinery
capital ratio. This is the value of machinery capital per worker as a
ratio of a hired farm worker's annual earnings. Both machinery values
and wages are expressed in the current prices of each given year. Even
this ratio changed little over the period studied, both in the aggre-
gate and on most farm types. The chief exceptions were among the cot-
ton farms that consistently show a ratio rising roughly at par with pro-
ductivity. This, however, reflects the slow rise of wages to hired labor
in cotton production.
It is thus not quite correct to say that American agriculture has
grown more capital intensive if the "real capital ratio" is taken as a
measure of capital intensity. When the ratio of farmers' and farm
workers' net earnings to total output is falling, this is related more to
the growing volume of intermediate products than to the stock value of
capital at year's end.
The rate at which labor used for agricultural production produces
income, in relation to the earning rates in other parts of the economy,
is shown in Figures 14-23. The curves in these diagrams show the num-
ber of hours of aggregated labor needed to produce one per capita
national income worth of the commodities in question. The labor force
in the United States is close to 40 percent of the total population, and
the over-all number of hours needed to produce one per capita national
income in the whole economy is therefore close to the same percentage
of a labor year, that is, about 800 hours.
Since the indications on the figures refer to aggregated labor, they
reflect the weighted average of production by both the farm labor and
the nonfarm labor involved. When the number of hours required to
produce one per capita national income is higher than average for the
economy in general, the tendency for farm labor to earn less is under-
stated, because it is averaged in with the nonfarm component, whose
earning power is in line with the rest of the economy. Conversely, in
those cases where the number of hours needed in some lines of agricul-
tural production is lower than average for the economy, farmers are
likely to have higher earnings than workers in industries and services.
This advantage may also be understated in our figures.
The data for the national farm economy show a rather steady level
up to 1944 (with a temporary, relative improvement from 1932 to 1936,
reflecting the absence of unemployment in the farm sector) of approxi-
mately 1,500 to 1,600 hours, thus close to twice the average national
level. In the mid-forties, the level fell to between 1,000 and 1,100 hours
— a sizable improvement. Only part of this improvement may have
come to farmers, since the nonfarm component in the aggregated labor
8 Bulletin No. 726 [September,
force is now so much larger in relative terms, and some part went to
the owners of farmland under lease.
Commodities show varying patterns which, however, add up to the
national one. Both the temporary improvement of the thirties and
the more lasting one of the late forties can be recognized in most of the
commodity diagrams. The absolute level of earning power is rather
different, both between commodities and also, in some commodities,
between farm types producing the same commodity.
The differences in level between commodities reflect the relative
prices of the commodities, including the effects of price supports. The
most highly productive farm types apparently are the Northwestern
wheat farms. The combination of high support prices and high levels
of wheat yields accounts for this. With a lower wheat price level these
farms would not appear to exceed the earning power of the cash grain
farms in the Corn Belt, as they now do. Wheat farms in general are
also among those where the earning power of aggregated labor has been
high recently, in contrast to their position in the early thirties.
Rates of remuneration better than those for the national (agricul-
tural and nonagricultural) economy as a whole are also seen on the
cash grain farms of the central Corn Belt, and the cotton farms in
California and some of those in Texas. Better than average rates of
remuneration for agriculture are found on most other wheat farms,
other Corn Belt farms, and on the ranches. Close to the national aver-
age for agriculture are most of the dairy farms, the New Jersey egg
farms, and some cotton farms. Other cotton farms are below the aver-
age agricultural level, as are most tobacco farms.
Several policy implications can be made from these analyses. The
usual contention that federal farm supports have had the effect of
slowing down progress in agriculture is not borne out; hypothetically,
positive effects may be inferred. Since the general tendency is for
farmers' net income to be a smaller fraction of total turnover as the
productivity rises, it follows that price sensitivity and the need for price
stability will increase rather than decrease as productivity rises further,
as it most certainly will, although perhaps not as rapidly as in the recent
past. As the farm exodus begins to level off, continued productivity
rise in agriculture will depend even more than before on the continued
rise in productivity in factories and offices. The prices at which pro-
duction requisites are supplied to farmers may become a major policy
issue as these prices become more and more decisive for the levels of
farm prices.
PRODUCTIVITY: CONCEPTS AND MEASUREMENT
Productivity is a measure of the relation between input and output
in physical terms. It is not really a measure of economic relations.
Nevertheless, changes in productivity are believed to be important to
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the economic welfare of society. If society at large gets more output
from the use of the same resources, then this should normally mean
progress. There might be exceptions when basic changes occur in the
modes of production and consumption, some types of output becoming
obsolescent, some resources becoming exhausted, etc. At the level of
specific industries and of individual firms, the connection between pro-
ductivity and rates of profit is more problematic. When overall produc-
tivity of a given commodity rises sharply, a fall in the relative price of
the commodity usually follows. Profits, or generally rates of earnings
to factors, may therefore not rise as fast as productivity; in some cases
they may not rise at all, and more commonly they rise no more than is
general in the whole economic system. If a firm has rising productivity,
it may still receive a declining rate of profit if the relative price of its
output falls more rapidly than its productivity rises, and vice versa. It
is in social rather than private or firm-level accounting that productivity
has the most direct relevancy to economic welfare. 1 Even there it is
the more relevant the more directly it expresses physical relations with-
out implying other economic relations in the way productivity has been
defined and measured.
There are several different concepts of productivity, and still more
ways of computing these measures. 2 Each productivity measure has
certain properties that render it suitable to express some phenomenon
that may be relevant to the knowledge of economic processes; each also
has its disabilities that render it unsuitable to explain certain phe-
nomena. The present study, because of its orientation, needs a pro-
ductivity measure that will illustrate the consequences to the whole
national economy of such productivity changes as can be discovered.
Productivity measures may be comprehensive or partial. A com-
prehensive measure should express the relation between all factors of
production on the one hand and the entire output of the firm or in-
dustry on the other. Partial measures may express the ratio between
one production factor, or a group of production factors, and all of the
output, or between some factors and that part of the output which these
factors are supposed to have generated.
Among the partial measures, output per man (or per man-hour) and
output per acre (or area unit in general) both have applications to cer-
tain problems in agricultural economics. Clearly, a change in either of
1 In the competition between firms, some advantage will of course accrue to
those who increase their productivity faster than the average for the industry.
2 Systematic reviews of productivity concepts used in agricultural economics
are found in J. Horring, Concepts of Productivity Measurement in Agriculture
on a National Scale, Paris, O.E.C.D., 1961 (O.E.C.D. Documentation in Agricul-
ture and Food, No. 57), and in C. O. Meiburg and K. Brandt, "Agricultural
Productivity in the United States 1870-1960," Food Research Institute Studies,
Stanford, Calif., May 1962.
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these ratios may be economically significant, but its significance cannot
be judged in isolation from other circumstances. Another kind of
partial measure is typified by the concept of net productivity, which is
the ratio between "internal" factors of production and the net output or
"value added" of the firm or industry. Against this concept, gross
productivity or the ratio between all inputs (both external and internal
factors) and all of the industry's or firm's output for final disposal
from the industry or firm is often represented as the most comprehen-
sive measure we have.
The concept used in this bulletin is that of aggregated labor pro-
ductivity. It is less comprehensive than gross productivity but it
raises fewer difficulties of concept and interpretation, and it is better
suited to the purpose of the present inquiry. Included on the input side
are all productive goods and services represented not by their money
value but by the amounts of human labor used to generate them. 3 Ex-
cluded among conventional inputs are rent on land and interest on
capital, both of which represent transfer payments rather than material
goods and services. Also excluded are, as in all other productivity
measures to date, government services, education, social overheads,
and so on. Agriculture and its suppliers are treated as one subsystem
of the economy.
The characteristics and the computation of aggregated labor pro-
ductivity, as well as the properties and the limitations of the most
commonly used conventional productivity measures, are examined in
the Technical Appendix. The main results are discussed below.
Both gross and net productivity measurements suffer from the
classical index-number problem, or the difficulty of aggregating in-
puts and outputs in terms that retain the same meaning over time. This
is not too serious in regard to the aggregate of agriculture's output,
which is relatively homogenous over time, with moderate changes in
commodity composition as well as quality and relative prices. The
difficulty is greater on the input side, especially in times when produc-
tivity changes rapidly, because of the effect this has on the relative
prices of labor and capital.
Gross productivity has the added disadvantage, which has been un-
noticed by most writers, that the rate of change which it is able to show
is in part dependent on the level of aggregation. Thus a gross produc-
tivity index for an industry is not comparable with any index at the
national level (which is always net), nor with those for subaggregates
within the industry (e.g., animal husbandry taken separately will not be
comparable with agriculture as a whole), nor even over time when
structural changes are profound. A net productivity index does not
share this fault, but has a drawback for the present inquiry in that it
refers to something less than the industry's total output.
3 The focusing on labor used aims merely at a descriptive account of certain
factual relations which exist within the economy. No value theory is implied.
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The aggregated labor productivity index avoids both of these diffi-
culties. It is comprehensive with regard to output. On the input side,
there is no index-number problem when all conventional inputs (other
than rent and interest) have been converted to their counterpart in labor,
using the current prices and wages of each year for the conversion.
The new index is less comprehensive in some other ways. Above all,
it has not incorporated some important explanatory variables that are
usually included in productivity measurement, whether gross or net.
It also fails to include, thus far, some elements of overhead cost that to
date have only been discussed but never included in any productivity
measurement.
The question of why labor becomes as productive as is the case is
clearly separate from the questions regarding direction and size of
change. Among the production factors not included in the computation
of the index is capital as a stock. Capital as a flow is included, as
should be clear from the description in the Technical Appendix. After
depreciation and new acquisitions plus upkeep and repair costs (the
flow elements) have been accounted for, capital (stock) costs are re-
duced to rent and interest. These are costs at the firm level, not at the
national level where they are transfer payments within the system.
There are some real costs associated with banking operations, but they
are minor. Land used for agricultural production has remained nearly
constant in physical terms over the period studied, and variations in its
rental value are mainly reflections of productivity changes.
Essentially, rent and interest are instruments for the distributive
allocation of product, and for deciding how resources are allocated as
between alternative productive uses. These functions are of the greatest
importance for the optimization of economic results. They contribute
to optimization and thus to explaining some of the reasons of produc-
tivity change. They represent human sacrifice in terms of waiting, not
of direct effort. Differently expressed, they represent alternatives in
the timing of physical inputs as well as of consumption. In a given
year, the volume of rental payments does not modify the volume of
product, only its distribution between people as consumers and between
firms as producers. When the focus is upon the welfare results of
productivity change, the size and composition of capital stock is a very
important explanatory variable, but its inclusion among inputs would
amount to double counting.
Outside the costs of production in this (as in all other productivity
studies, to date) are also the ''social overheads." These include educa-
tion, extension, research, public administration, and public works in
roads. These services represent considerable amounts of human labor
and it would be desirable to include these amounts to the extent that
they are relevant to the agricultural production process. The amounts
are very difficult to compute, however. The budgets of agencies per-
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forming the services are known, but no technique has been found to
separate those parts of their activities that could be labeled as produc-
tion inputs into agriculture. Clearly, some parts are not agricultural at
all (e.g., the Forest Service), while some have mixed or dual functions,
benefiting both farmers and others. The most difficult part is education
in all its forms, which is in fact part investment and part consumption.
Expenses of these kinds affecting agricultural production are likely
to have increased over the period under consideration; but these
changes, had they been included among production costs, would have
affected the productivity index only rather slightly.
Another group of inputs that might have been included are
federal projects involving land reclamation and new irrigation facilities.
Part of these investments could also be charged to agriculture, on con-
dition that a method is found to identify agriculture's share in projects
that are, to a great extent, multipurpose in character. This problem
area is not of very great significance on the national level, but in certain
areas, and for some commodities, its influence may be sizable.
All of the above-mentioned factors must be regarded as explanatory
variables. None of them are indispensable for the estimate of indirect
labor. The index computed according to the above indications remains
an essentially meaningful expression of the trend of productivity
change as a contributor to national welfare.
PRODUCTIVITY OF AGGREGATED LABOR:
UNITED STATES TOTALS
The index of aggregated labor productivity was worked out for the
United States as a whole by the two separate techniques described in
the Technical Appendix. In addition, one more series of United States
totals was computed by aggregation from commodity-level data. The
purpose of this aggregation was chiefly to provide a test on the accuracy
and reasonableness of the commodity data; the results are discussed in
the next section.
These analyses of the agricultural output subsystem led, first of all,
to an approximate measure of that part of the nonagricultural labor
force used to produce and service production requisites for agriculture. 1
With some variation, the sum of indirect labor absorbed by agriculture
has been surprisingly stable at 1.5 to 2 million man-years per year
throughout the whole period from 1919 to 1965. In the years around
1920, the data show a level close to 2 million man-years annually. Even
if it is assumed that this is caused by special circumstances in those
years, any increase in the use of indirect labor from the middle and late
1920's up until around 1960 would only be from 1.5 million man-years
1 See W. Gossling and F. Dovring, "Labor Productivity Measurement : The
Use of Subsystems in the Interindustry Approach, and Some Approximating
Alternatives." Jour. Farm Econ. 48 :377. 1966.
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Table 1.— Numerical Comparisons of Gossling and Dovring Indexes
of Labor Productivity (Output per Man-Year)
Gossling index I Dovring index II
Year
Variant l a Variant 2 b Variant 3 C Variant l d Variant 2 C
1919 35 35 34 35 35
1929 43 43 42 43 43
1939 48 48 52 52 46
1954 85 85 85 82 82
1957-1959 .. .. 100
a Using full-sized input-output tables presented in Appendix C of W. Gossling, "A New
Economic Model of Structural Change in U.S. Agriculture and Supporting Industries." Un-
published Ph.D. thesis, University of Illinois. 1965.
b Using full-sized input-output tables presented in Series III tables in the Appendix to
Gossling, op. cit. There are differences of less than a percentage point in variants 1 and 2 of
the Gossling index I.
c Using two-industry input-output tables presented in Series III tables in the Appendix to
Gossling, op. cit.
d Calculated from United States National Income and Agricultural Statistics.
Note: For sources of data on employment see Appendix G to Gossling, op. cit. The index
base for columns 1, 2, 3, and 5 uses Dovring's 1957-1959 employment figure. It is assumed that
the ratio of external output to "entire output less intra-agricultural output" is the same for
1957-1959 as for 1954.
Source: W. Gossling and F. Dovring, "Labor Productivity Measurement: The Use of
Subsystems in the Interindustry Approach, and Some Approximating Alternatives." Jour.
Farm. Econ. 48:375. 1966.
to about 2 million. During this same time the agricultural labor force
fell from over 10 million in the 1920's to 4 million in 1960 and to
even less since then. Substitution of capital for labor has thus been
highly remunerative to the economy at large. The industries and
services supplying farm requisites have increased their productivity to
such a degree that they have been able to supply a vastly increased
physical volume of goods and services without using up any corres-
pondingly increased portion of the nation's work force.
In index-number terms, the shortcut method and the matrix method
yield indexes that, for convenience, are named the ''Dovring index"
and the "Gossling index" after their originators. There are several
variants of each which are described elsewhere. 2
The two types of indexes are in substantial agreement as to the
magnitude of long-term productivity changes. One set of comparable
figures is shown in Table 1. In these figures, the number of hours in
a work-year also varies in agriculture. This leads to a somewhat slower
productivity rate than that obtained from data in man-hours.
The table indicates that productivity gains tripled over four decades
and doubled over the last two. An element of acceleration is crudely
visible in these data. The data also show that productivity improvement
was slower in the second decade than in the first, thus confirming that the
crisis of the 1930's had effects on the medium-term trend. The faster
2 See W. Gossling, "A New Economic Model of Structural Change in U.S.
Agriculture and Supporting Industries." Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University
of Illinois. 1965.
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rise after 1939 might to some extent reflect recovery from the after-
math of the crisis.
These conclusions are further illustrated by the year-to-year series
as shown in Figure 1. The Dovring index (man-year variant) is here
based on the standard assumption of 2,400 hours in an agricultural
work-year. Thus in effect it represents the man-hour concept as regards
farm labor. This in itself would lead to a somewhat sharper uptrend
than if the agricultural work-year is assumed to become shorter over
the decades. At the same time the assumed length of the agricultural
work-year is on the high side. Thus it reduces the absolute number of
agricultural work-years and hence the relative weight of the declining
agricultural component in relation to the slightly expanding urban com-
ponent of the total. Therefore the apparent difference in the rate of
productivity increase in comparison with the data in Table 1 is not
very large.
More important than any such technical differences is the fact that
the data shown in Figure 1 display a distinct pattern of growth. The
curve reflects a rather smoothly accelerating rhythm. The rate of
acceleration has in fact been constant from 1920 to 1960. It is possible
that the rhythm has been decelerating since around 1960 (see page 22).
The broken-line curve accompanying the empirical data represents the
movement that would have resulted if each year's incremental rate
were always 3.5 percent higher than that of the preceding year. At
such a rhythm, the rate of gain would double every twenty years, as
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has indeed been the case. The rate of annual productivity gain was
about 1.5 percent around 1920, close to 3 percent around 1940, and 6
percent around 1960. Productivity thus did not just grow by simple
compound interest, but the rate of increase did. 3
The discovering of a growth rate that is accelerating at a constant
rate is at first highly surprising. Previous analyses had indicated
certain periods with different productivity increase. In gross terms,
for instance, there had been some moderate but noticeable rate of in-
crease before 1910, thereafter a more or less static period, and finally
a high rate of gain starting in the late 1930's. The data in Figure 1 show
the 1920's as improving at a rather steady rate which, in principle,
would have made it possible to foresee the even higher rates in subse-
quent decades. The years of crisis and drouth in the early and mid-
thirties now appear merely as an episodic deviation, and from 1941
onwards the real trend again agrees with the result of an extrapolation
of the acceleration going on in the twenties. The year 1931 is still
on the trend line, 1932 even above it, and only two bad drouth years
(1934 and 1936) fall very seriously below it.
3 To illustrate the principle of change, the following expressions may be used:
Year Output per man-year
a
1 ab
2 abx
3 ab(x 2 )
n abCx"" 1 )
where a is output per man at the start of the period, b is the incremental rate at
the start of the period (in this case 1.015), and x the rate of acceleration (in this
case 1.035). The expression can also be written exponentially, assuming each
year's productivity increment to be to the x power of that of the preceding one
:
Year Output per man-year
a
1 ab
2 a(b*)
3 a(b*
2
)
n a(bx )
On magnitudes such as those represented in this material, the difference is slight.
a(bx ) differs from ab(x D ' x ) by only a slight fraction in values under 1.06. Most
of this difference could be removed by a small reduction in the value of x. Only
at rates of annual growth considerably in excess of 6 percent would the difference
become disturbing; but such high values are practically excluded, as we shall
see later. For rates of growth below 1.5 percent per year, the difference between
the two types of ratio is too small to be traced in empirical data.
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Before commenting upon the rate of acceleration, it should be
mentioned that the same rate can be traced in the other productivity
measures. Figure 2 shows a comparison between the gross, net, and
aggregated labor productivity indexes. 4 The indexes have been placed
on different absolute levels in order to make them more readable, but
the scales are the same and the slopes of the three curves are therefore
comparable. The broken lines accompanying the three series of empiri-
cal data also have different shapes in this figure, but they are all parts
of the same function as described above, reflecting accelerating produc-
tivity gains at a constant rate of acceleration of 3.5 percent per year.
The elements of the broken-line curve accompanying the diagram for
net productivity are the same as those for aggregated labor produc-
tivity, but always with a 10-year lag; those of the broken-line curve
accompanying the gross productivity diagram are also the same,
although with a lag of 26 years in relation to the curve accompanying
the aggregated labor productivity diagram. Expressed in different
4 The gross productivity index is taken from R. A. Loomis and G. T. Barton,
Productivity of Agriculture, United States, 1870-1958. USDA, 1961. The net
productivity index is taken from J. W. Kendrick, Productivity Trends in the
United States. National Bureau of Economic Research, General Series, No. 71,
pp. 363 sq. Princeton, 1961.
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terms, this means that the yearly incremental rate of net productivity in
each given year is always 0.71 times that of aggregated labor productiv-
ity; similarly the incremental rate of gross productivity in each given
year amounts to 0.41 times that of the aggregated labor productivity
incremental rate in the same year. The corresponding proportion be-
tween the rates of gross and net productivity increment is 0.58:1.
The fit is satisfactory on all three curves; but if gross productivity
data were all we had, the evidence would hardly be convincing. The
gross productivity curve taken in isolation could also be read as re-
flecting two linear trends with a break sometime in the early thirties.
The comparison between the three curves establishes beyond any doubt
that they all reflect the same constantly accelerating trend of productiv-
ity increase with the same acceleration factor of 3.5 percent.
This comparison leads to some further reflections on the nature and
merits of the alternative productivity measures. First of all, it places
more stress on what they have in common. Since we are looking at
essentially the same thing in all three diagrams, it should not be too
surprising that they are found to contain basically the same long-term
trend. But the capacity of the three indexes to reveal this trend is not
the same. The acceleration factor was easiest to discover in the
aggregated labor productivity index; in the net productivity diagram,
the same trend would be evident once it was discovered, but it was less
easy to discover. The gross productivity curve, because of its statistical
properties as discussed above and in the Technical Appendix, has so
weak a trend that the continuous acceleration could hardly have been
discovered, and could certainly not have been regarded as conclusive
evidence without the comparison with the other indexes. The gross
measure is more likely to lead to conclusions about productivity trends
as being erratic or incidental rather than expressing built-in long-range
tendencies in the economic system. It is no small merit of the
aggregated labor productivity index that it enabled us to make the dis-
covery of the constantly accelerating trend.
The fact of constant relations between the three productivity
diagrams may serve to remove some of the objections against the gross
and net measures that rely on the index-number problem as regards
inputs; but this improvement in their standing may be valid only over
the length of period shown and not for even longer periods. For the
comparison between gross productivity and aggregated labor produc-
tivity, it is clear that the proportion between yearly incremental rates
that characterizes the diagrams for the total agricultural economy does
not hold for subsytems within agriculture, as will be shown in some
detail in the next section. The property of the gross measure to be de-
pendent on the level of aggregation is in no way corrected.
This acceleration of trend raises several questions. How long has
this been going on, how does it relate to the tendencies of the economy
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in general, what are the specific causes for this to happen in agriculture,
and how long can the same phenomenon go on in the future? None
of these questions can be given a definitive answer here, but some
tentative suggestions are offered.
For years prior to 1919, information on purchased farm inputs is
less precise and less reliable than for more recent years. The entire
statistical basis for calculations of this kind is weaker. At the same
time it is obvious, as one follows these older statistics, that the nonfarm
indirect labor serving agriculture through external inputs was a
smaller absolute quantity as well as a smaller part of total aggregated
labor used for agricultural production. Compared to the total nonfarm
economy, they were rather a similar fraction, or even a somewhat larger
one; but the farther back one searches, the smaller were also the non-
farm sectors, both absolutely and in comparison with the farm sector.
The fraction of nonfarm production that went into farm production
requisites was about 4 to 5 percent in the 1920's (as compared to only
3 percent recently), and close to 6 percent around 1900; some very
weak data indicate that it was 8 percent around 1870. The smaller
absolute size of these nonagricultural inputs for agriculture, and their
smaller relative size within the agricultural input aggregate, makes any
lack of accuracy in their estimation less crucial for the estimates of
aggregated labor input, the vast bulk of which was determined in
those early decades by the size of the agricultural labor force. Because
of this, some idea can be had of the magnitude of output per man-year
of aggregated labor for these early decades— in fact with somewhat
less uncertainty than is the case with the gross and net productivity
measures. Imprecise as these estimates are, they indicate that the same
accelerating trend with the same acceleration factor may have been at
work for at least a hundred years. 5 If this is true, then the typical
annual rate of productivity increment was }i percent around 1900, y%
percent in 1880, and just over }4 percent in 1870. The same principle
may have been at work even farther back in the economic history of
the country; but on that level, annual increments were so low and so
far overshadowed by short-run movements that it would be very diffi-
cult to make the evidence positive.
In the same way certain indications can be obtained for both gross
and net productivity gains since 1870. The decennial estimates from
5 During the entire second half of the nineteenth century, important productiv-
ity gains were made in some lines of agricultural production and very little in
others. Gains in the efficiency of direct labor in grain production have been ex-
plored by W. N. Parker and Judith L. V. Klein, "Productivity Growth in Grain
Production in the United States, 1840-60 and 1900-10," Output, Employment, and
Productivity in the United States after 1800. National Bureau of Economic
Research, Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 30, by the Conference on Research
in Income and Wealth, pp. 523-580. New York, 1966. Output per man-hour (of
direct, on-farm labor only) of wheat, oats, and corn rose about 3.5 to 4 times
during the period from 1839 to 1911.
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1870 to 1910 are crude and of low reliability and neither confirm nor
contradict the hypothesis that the same rate of acceleration may have
been at work for a century. The rates of annual productivity increase
that must have characterized those early times could be made to fit any
one of several alternative formulas for continuous long-term change.
This accelerating productivity trend in agriculture bears an in-
triguing relation to the growth rates in the rest of the United States
economy. Growth of overall productivity has also been accelerating
inasmuch as its rate of increase is higher in recent decades than it was
prior to World War I. Usually this is interpreted merely as a break
in trend around 1919 (possibly as early as 1917), with a lower
constant rate before this break and a higher one thereafter. 6 The possi-
bility that the whole movement might have been one of accelerating
rise in productivity has been discussed. The difficulty is that if there is
any continuous acceleration in national product per man as convention-
ally defined, then the acceleration factor must have been very much
lower than in agriculture in recent decades. It might also be possible
that the break in trend came from agriculture which is usually
included with the rest of the national economy in these calculations.
The years around 1920 were in fact those when the rate of productivity
increase in agriculture began to catch up with that of the economy in
general. It also appears that, when agriculture is subtracted, the rest
of the economy shows no discernible acceleration since 1920.
All of this assumes implicitly that the productivity of agriculture
and industry are fully comparable. Between the two there exists an
important difference, however. In agriculture, as already pointed out
in the preceding section, the index-number problem is of small con-
sequence for the output index. Farm output has continued to consist
of essentially the same commodities, in roughly similar proportions
between them since 1870. The addition of commodities such as soybeans
and grain sorghum had little impact, since these new products are
substitutes for farm commodities that were already being produced, and
since they are produced by essentially the same types of technology.
Introduction of entirely new crops for entirely new uses and produced
by essentially new techniques occurred much earlier when tobacco,
cotton, etc., became staple products on American farms, but there has
been no comparable upheaval in the farm output aggregate during the
last hundred years.
The same cannot be said of industry, or of services using industri-
ally produced equipment. Industry is continuously generating entirely
new products, some of which serve entirely new purposes, while some
others serve old purposes in such radically different ways that the
change is difficult to incorporate into conventional output indexes. The
6
J. W. Kendrick, op. cit., pp. 65-71.
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change in the efficiency of mail carriage through use of railroads, air-
planes, and the telegraph is not measured by comparisons with the cost
of carrying the mail by men on horseback or by stagecoach; it is
measured in comparison with alternate uses of the same industrial re-
sources. The industrial cost of building and servicing the telegraph
system is what goes into the national income accounts, not the use
value of the new means of conveyance in terms of the number of men
on horseback who would have been needed to carry the same number of
messages over the same distances. The gain in time often has no
counterpart at all, since instant delivery was not physically possible
before. To send a letter across the United States would have required
many man-days of work in the prerailroad age; now it can be done
very quickly and inexpensively. No one has ever calculated the astro-
nomical gain in productivity of this in terms of the final commodity or
the final service. Similarly, the contribution to national income from
building and servicing electronic computers is estimated on the basis
of the cost of doing so based on conventional inputs used in the process.
The use-value would include the number of clerks handling previously
used means of computation that would be needed for the tasks now
handled by the new computers. Such a measure of productivity in-
crease would show much sharper gains than result from conventional
national income data, but the attempt has hardly been made to compute
productivity in such terms. Yet this is what would be needed to make
real comparisons with agriculture.
Productivity trends can be said to be comparable only to the extent
that the final output is essentially similar in character over the time
period studied. American agriculture comes into this category, and so
might some other raw-material industries such as coal mining. In most
lines of industrial production there are important discontinuities, as dis-
cussed above, that the index numbers fail to reflect. It is therefore
premature to state that productivity has not been accelerating in other
sectors of the economy. The indications set forth above suggest that
all the conventional productivity measures understate the real gains in
commodity production and hence tend to depress the index and possibly
to conceal some inherent accelerating tendencies. It is of course also
possible that some of these gains are neutralized by the increasing
overhead costs in services that are immune to productivity change or
even retrograde. The net effect for single commodities or for homo-
geneous commodity groups might be discovered by analyses similar to
those presented above for agriculture.
Unless there were built-in accelerating tendencies in the industrial
economy, it is hard to see how even agriculture could have displayed as
much acceleration as it has. Most of this movement has come from the
greater efficiency of industrially produced and scientifically based means
of production. It is industry and science that have supplied the in-
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creased leverage of labor used for agricultural production reflected in
the indexes above. In the industrial sectors of national income accounts,
the machinery, chemicals, etc., supplied to agriculture are entered at
their costs of production; radical innovations remain buried in the
index numbers and are not seen. It is when these inputs are linked up
directly with the agricultural sector, as in the present analysis, that the
effect is really seen in full. Here the effect of industrial improvements
becomes measured in terms of labor displaced in relation to a final
output of more or less unchanged character. This will be even more
evident in the commodity-level analyses where we can see, for instance,
the number of man-years needed to produce a given quantity of wheat
at various points in time. The index-number problem is eliminated.
This gives a true measure of the increasing efficiency of basic industrial
technology. The accelerating trend of agricultural productivity thus
allows us to infer an accelerating trend in industrial productivity that
the index-number problem prevents us from seeing clearly in most
branches of industry.
There are of course many causes of these spectacular changes.
Superficially, one could point to the accelerating exodus of people from
agriculture and the continuing substitution of capital for labor. How-
ever, this is merely a restatement in different terms of the descriptive
starting point. Increase in the productivity of aggregated labor consists
of a rising ratio of output to labor used. Given the relatively slow rate
at which agricultural output may increase, reduction of manpower is
the obvious prerequisite for rapid productivity increase. This rapid
exodus is not an explanation of the process; it is the main part of the
process. Repeating this over again in different ways will not explain it.
Behind the rate of farm exodus, as a process of productivity im-
provement, there are different causes that may be invoked at different
levels of analysis. The increasing efficiency of mechanical, chemical,
and biological means of production is an obvious prerequisite, and in a
certain sense the rate of productivity increase may be said to reflect
rates of advancement in technology. It also reflects rates of adoption
and competent application of technology. The time trend is thus in-
fluenced by things such as diffusion of knowledge, build-up of technical
competency at the farm-operator level, and the ability and willingness
to obtain the financing that may be necessary to bring the more efficient
means of production into application in quantity. The time trend, if
we can call it that, is then a result of both the trend in technology (in-
creasing leverage of more and more systematic knowledge allowing a
more efficient approach to the problems of mastering nature) and of
educational, financial, and other allied factors that together promote
or retard the application of new technology. Even though it is obvious
that there is a lag between invention and broad application, it does not
follow that the rate of productivity increase is much slower than tech-
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nological trends alone would make possible, since later phases receive
booster effects when the delayed technology arrives to full application.
The acceleration of productivity in agriculture possibly reflects ac-
celerating tendencies in the economic system as a whole. The timing
of this acceleration in agriculture is, in any event, also a function of
the relative sector proportions between agriculture and other industries.
The very rapid exodus of people from agriculture that occurred in the
1950's could hardly have happened much earlier, because in each earlier
decade the farm sector was relatively larger and the difficulty of ab-
sorbing whatever surplus manpower it might have had was correspond-
ingly greater. By the same token, the possibilities of supplying and
financing industrially produced means of production were correspond-
ingly smaller. As shown above, the percentage of the nonagricultural
production of the country that went to agriculture as production inputs
has always been small and, if anything, it has grown gradually smaller.
The recent very high rates of increase in agricultural productivity are
thus also a function of the stage of economic development in which
the country finds itself.
If acceleration as such can be read as a function of technological
and general economic development, at least its timing may to some
extent have been affected by the details of economic policy during the
period under study. As will be shown in some detail in the following
section, the rate of productivity increase has not been uniform and its
variations are to some extent related to price levels, including the levels
of support price that have been in effect. The trend shown for the agri-
cultural economy as a whole has some features that suggest an almost
automatic process; but it cannot really be accepted as entirely auto-
matic. Inadequate economic policies or incidental catastrophies might
have hindered it to an extent that the crisis of the early thirties did
not. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how the trend could possibly
have been much more rapid.
This leads to the question of how long such a trend may continue.
Not forever. This follows from the principle of acceleration, for even-
tually the rates of change and levels of productivity would be absurd.
Any continuously accelerating trend has to break sometime. It may even
be that it already has broken, sometime close to 1960, as suggested by
the data shown in Figure 1. If the rate of annual productivity increase
were to continue to double every twenty years, it would reach 12 per-
cent annually around 1980, which is highly unlikely, and 24 percent
around the year 2000, which is certainly not possible. Within the next
ten to twenty years the rate of acceleration will have to slow down.
What pattern and rate of growth in agricultural productivity will follow
cannot now be foreseen. Data from recent years indicate the possibility
(unconfirmed because the new trend is as yet too short) of a decelera-
tion at 3.5 percent per year since 1960 or perhaps 1958. Such a trend
1967] Productivity of Agricultural Labor 23
would have the rate of productivity gain fall to half in 20 years, but it
would still result in very substantial gains in the decades to come.
The break in trend, whether it has already happened or is only im-
pending in the near future, can be discussed from at least two mutually
complementing angles.
For one thing, a situation will eventually come about where the
amount of direct labor in agriculture becomes smaller than the amount
of indirect labor used to produce and service its production requisites.
In such a situation, any continued decline in the use of direct on-farm
labor will have less incidence on the rate of productivity change than
before. At some point the agricultural labor force will have become so
small that its absolute size is of minor importance both for the cost
budget of agriculture and even more for the consumer prices of farm-
based goods such as food and clothing. At this "indifference point"
it will no longer be necessary to maintain those income pressures that
have been the driving force in the rapid farm exodus of recent decades.
In addition, when external capital ceases to displace farm labor, its
rates of utilization and depreciation will become more crucial than they
have been so far. Further sharp rises in the productivity of aggregated
labor used for agricultural production would then depend chiefly on
further rising productivity in the factories that produce these machines,
chemicals, etc. Even though such productivity improvements may turn
out to be spectacular in automated factories, the servicing aspects of
farm requisites may remain more labor intensive.
All of this points toward the conclusion that, in regard to agricul-
ture, essentially different types of economic policy will be necessary
in the medium-term, if not already in the short-term future.
A point can be made in regard to relative income. Figure 1 shows,
among other things, that output per man-year in agricultural produc-
tion has risen sharply in recent years, and seemingly much faster than
in the economy as a whole. Even though this may in part be an illusion
because of the index-number problem in industry previously mentioned,
it is quite likely that productivity in the agricultural subsystem has
risen more than in the general economy. 7 In the dollar terms used in
the diagram, which refers to 1954 prices for both series, it would ap-
pear that agriculture was, at long last, about to catch up with the rest
T One further reservation, although of minor importance during the period
under study, relates to the increasing specialization of farm labor on farming
alone. In older times, the labor force working on farms did a great deal of
work other than farming— in processing the farm products intended for use by
the household and sometimes others as well, in making and repairing tools, and
even in building houses, making shoes, etc. The gradual disappearance of these
activities is a partial offset against the rise in farm productivity which may be
sizable in the phases of transition between a traditional, mainly agricultural
economy, and a modern industrial economy. In the United States, over the
period under study, the modifications which could be brought in by considering
this aspect are certain to be minor, however.
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of the economy in the relative ability to earn income. This has not
occurred to the extent indicated by the diagram, for farm prices have
continued to fall relative to prices in general, and the gap in earning
ability is still larger than the diagram would indicate. Such a change
in relative prices is to be expected when one sector improves its
productivity more rapidly than others. Nevertheless, as productivity
change in agriculture slows down, there has to be an adjustment of
prices and earnings so that finally all factors used for agricultural pro-
duction arrive at a similar rate of returns as similar factors earn else-
where in the economy. This conclusion, too, will call for some
reorientation of economic policy in regard to agriculture.
COMMODITY ANALYSES
The analyses discussed in the preceding section were made on
United States agriculture as a whole. Working with an aggregate of
that size, it is very likely that one obtains a general picture in which
numerous significant features are balancing each other. Disaggregation
into meaningful subsystems is clearly desirable in order to obtain ma-
terial for more detailed conclusions and thereby to better characterize
the aggregate and its changes.
Productivity indexes for several commodities were computed from
data on commercial farms by type and location which are published
annually by the USDA. 1 Some of these farm-type data series begin in
1930, others at various later dates; several of the series were started
in the mid-forties, a few only in the 1950's. A few were changed as to
their type recently, causing the homogeneous series to be discontinued.
Several of these farm types are close to being one-product firms
and can be analyzed accordingly. Data about the share of marketing
receipts coming from the major product on the various farm types
under study are shown in Table 2.
Where there is only one major product and where other products
are negligible, there is obviously no index-number problem on the out-
put side. Output can then be specified in physical rather than monetary
terms. This is the case with the New Jersey poultry farms (egg pro-
ducers) and some of the cattle ranches. Some other farm types have
a secondary product which is of so little importance that the assump-
tion that the main product takes its share of the costs in proportion
to its share in sale value entails very little potential error; these cases
can also safely be treated as if they were one-product farms. Such is
the case of at least one of the dairy-farm types (central Northeast) and
some of the tobacco farms.
1 An example of the computation procedure is shown in Appendix Table 2.
Details of the procedure may be found in Chapter 3 of J. V. Leunis, "Productiv-
ity of Accumulated Labor in U.S. Agriculture : Analyses by Farm Types." Un-
published M.S. thesis, University of Illinois, 1965.
1967] Productivity of Agricultural Labor 25
Table 2.— Percentage of Marketing Receipts From the Major Product
on Different Farm Types, Average 1930-1934 and 1956-1960
Periods
Farm types
1930-1934 1956-1960
Dairy farms 60-80 60-85
Poultry farms 97
Corn Belt farms
Cotton farms 70-85 60-80
Tobacco farms 50-85 40-80
Wheat farms 40-70 40-70
Cattle ranches 80-95 75-95
Sheep ranches 85-90 80-85
Source: Estimates are based on data in "Costs and Returns on Commercial Farms."
USDA Statistical Bulletin 297 and sequels.
The same principle can in fact be also applied on farm types where
the main product is less dominant. Where the balance of the output
consists of several minor products, it is reasonable to assume that each
product absorbs inputs in proportion to its share in total output value.
Where there are two main products of similar proportions, the treat-
ment may appear less evident at first glance, and an element of index-
number problem comes into the picture. The problem is solved prac-
tically by treating such farm types as one-product farms alternatively
for one and for the other of the two main products. The indexes that
come out of such calculations usually resemble those obtained for the
same commodities from farm types which come closer to being really
one-product farms. For instance, a tobacco-dairy farm in Kentucky
yields a productivity index for tobacco that has a similar level and a
similarly slow movement to indexes derived from other tobacco farms;
its dairy component yields a productivity index for milk that rises at a
similar rapid rate to indexes obtained from other dairy farms, and has
only a slightly lower absolute level of output per unit of aggregated
labor than these. The contrast between the slow movement of produc-
tivity in tobacco, and the much more rapid one in milk, in a case like
this, is balanced by the contrary movements of the relative prices of
the two commodities, as will be shown in some detail in a later section.
The equimarginal principle takes expression in these relations to such
an extent that productivity indexes can also be computed, with some
reserve, for the two main products of an outspoken two-product farm.
To what extent this can be done even when the second product is of
considerably smaller importance than the leading one is in part a matter
of judgment. The sheep ranches form a special case because of the
way in which the two products are associated.
Another set of estimates for the whole of U.S. agriculture was
computed from commodity-level data as described in the Technical
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Appendix. The result is shown in Figure 3. On the whole, the differ-
ences between the index computed through aggregation of farm-type
data and that computed directly on the basis of aggregate national data
are such as could be expected from the procedure. They are in line
with the differences in the statistical properties of the two series. The
total use of direct labor fell more sharply in the late 1930's, by these
indications, than according to aggregate USDA data; in the early 1950's
the two series are again in better agreement. As a consequence, produc-
tivity appears higher in these data, during the period from 1938 to 1953,
than in those computed from aggregate statistics; but the rise in
productivity appears to be slower from 1940 to 1950. The limitation
to commercial farms, and among these to those most highly mechanized,
is the obvious explanation.
This exercise confirms that the commodity-level indexes are reason-
ably comparable with the national index as well as with each other. The
national series computed by means of aggregation from farm-type data
would have to be refined in several ways before it could be used to
substitute for the series computed directly on the basis of aggregate
national data.
Commodity data are shown in Figures 4 through 13, sometimes with
two charts for one commodity in order to make the figures more read-
able. In most cases, moving five-year averages are used to reduce the
year-to-year variation reflecting weather. Since the longest series start in
1930, there is a weakness in the data in that the first five-year averages
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already include some of the worst depression years with their combina-
tion of drouth and reduced economic activity. To correct for the
impression of very large productivity increases in subsequent years,
some of the figures show the annual data for 1930 to 1932 in a small
separate graph with a symbol for the average of that three-year period.
As illustrative examples, diagrams for gross productivity are also
shown in two of the figures (corn, Fig. 5, and eggs, Fig. 9).
Wheat. Figures 4a and 4b show productivity indexes for six dif-
ferent wheat-producing farm types, representing three principal wheat-
producing areas: the northern Great Plains, the southern Great Plains,
and the Northwest wheat area.
Total variation in productivity has been enormous, especially on the
Great Plains, but most of this variation was caused by the catastrophic
decline in production during certain years of the 1930's. When pre-
crisis levels are considered (and they represent wheat yields that were
rather typical of the preceding decade), total productivity increase
from 1930 to 1960 has been rather moderate on the southern Plains and
somewhat greater on the northern Plains where the yield level at the
beginning of the period was even lower. The "plateau" shown from the
early forties to the early fifties is in fact not much higher than the pre-
crisis level, and most of the productivity increase has therefore been
achieved since the mid-1950's.
The Northwest wheat farms show a partly different picture. The
sharp rise in productivity throughout the thirties is real, as there was
no drop in the crisis years, and the precrisis level (which was lower
here than in the Great Plains) represents acre yields that are on line
with those of the 1920's in the same area. The lull in productivity in-
crease during most of the 1940's and the early 1950's also occurs here,
and the renewed productivity increase since the mid-1950's is hardly
more striking than on the Great Plains.
Productivity on the Great Plains roughly doubled during the period
from 1930 to 1960. This clearly has been only a minor factor in the
national picture since 1930. The Northwest has contributed more, by
nearly quadrupling output per hour of aggregated labor. This is more
rapid than the national trend, but the scope of the area is smaller. None
of the wheat productivity curves can be fitted to any variant of the
national accelerating function. This is not surprising because many
of the technological gains in wheat productivity were made long ago. 2
What remained (and remains) to be gained in productivity in wheat
production is mainly through biological inputs such as higher-yielding
seed and chemical ferilizers that have contributed more in the North-
west than on the Great Plains.
Corn. Figure 5 shows productivity indicators for cash grain farms
in the central Corn Belt. In the same way as on most wheat farms,
2 Cf . W. N. Parker and Judith L. V. Klein, op. tit.
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the start of the curve for aggregated labor productivity is depressed
because of crisis conditions. The precrisis level of the first three years
reflects crop yields on a level with those that prevailed in the 1920's.
Recovery to the precrisis level in the late 1930's was followed by only
a rather slow rise in aggregated labor productivity until sometime in
the early fifties when a quicker pace began. The total rise in produc-
tivity was higher than in the case of the Great Plains wheat farms, but
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the time pattern is strikingly similar. The tempo is somewhat slower
than that of the national trend. The curve for corn could be fitted to
a variant of the national trend (accelerating at 3.5 percent per year)
with about a 10-year lag behind the national trend.
The gross productivity curve shown on the same graph shows
smaller gains on the whole than the aggregated labor productivity
curve, but at least the trends are in the same direction for the most
part, in contrast to the comparison made for eggs (Fig. 9, page 35).
Gross productivity in corn production appears to have advanced some-
what more rapidly than is the case with the national trend for agricul-
ture, which points to the lack of comparability between gross produc-
tivity trends.
Soybeans. When the same farm type is used to compute produc-
tivity indicators for soybeans, a diagram with a striking resemblance
to that for corn emerges (not shown on the graph). The soybean
component was small in the beginning and grew larger during most of
the period covered, which makes this diagram less conclusive.
Cotton. Productivity indexes for cotton-producing farms are shown
in Figures 6a and 6b. Ten farm types are represented, but only two
of these for the whole period. These two show a slight drop during
the crisis years, but their first five-year averages are likely to be repre-
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sentative of longer-term trends; averages for the first three years are
slightly above the first five-year averages, but the cotton yields in
Georgia and Texas in those years were also somewhat above the level
to be expected from comparison with data of the 1920's.
The lowest productivity level (in terms of pounds per hour) is
found in the Piedmont-area farm type, and this is also where the rate
of productivity change has been lowest and most continuous. As shown
in Figure 6a, this curve can be fitted to a function accelerating 3.5 per-
cent per year, at a time lag of about 15 years behind the national trend.
The other curves are too irregular, and most of them too short, to be
fitted to any continuous trend line. The black prairie, the peanut-cotton,
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the large and small delta, and the irrigated high plains farms are not
far removed from the national trend of productivity rise, as far as
the data go. The black prairie farm displays a markedly slower rate of
improvement from the late thirties to the early fifties, and a more
rapid rise thereafter. The lull of the forties is also in evidence in the
Texas high plains non-irrigated farms and, to the extent possible to
show, in the shorter coverage of the other series outside of California.
Viewed in this way, the productivity rise of most cotton farm types
is mutually quite consistent and in line with the tendencies of the wheat
and corn farms.
One may notice that the rate of productivity rise on the small-scale
delta farm type is nearly as rapid as on the large-scale one; and the
latter, although by far the largest among all the farm types shown, is
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only about average both in level of productivity and in its rate of
increase.
The three California farm types appear to form a pattern apart
from the rest. At the beginning of the series, in the late forties, all
three were on a higher level of productivity than any of the other
farm types, and all three were consistently rising at a time when the
other farm types were lingering in a period of standstill or rather slow
change. Later on, in the period when the other farm types began an
acceleration of trend which in many cases exceeded the general rate of
productivity increase in the same years, the California farm types
leveled out, with only much smaller relative productivity gains around
1960 (in absolute terms— as pounds per hour— they are more im-
pressive than in index terms). As a result, the difference in the absolute
level of productivity has again diminished. The Texas high plains
farms, which are now close to those of California in the absolute level
of productivity, may also be entering a phase of slower increase; no
such deceleration is as yet evident on the other farm types with their
continuing lower absolute level.
Peanuts. One of the cotton farm types has peanuts as a second major
crop. Separate productivity indicators for peanuts from this farm type
are shown in Figure 7.
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The trend from the mid-1940's to the early 1960's can be fitted to
the national trend of productivity increase at 3.5 percent per year with
no time lag. In addition, peanuts also display a lag around 1950 as was
discussed in connection with both grain farms and cotton farms.
Tobacco, Productivity trends for six tobacco-producing farm types
are shown in Figure 8. The time coverage is short and not quite the
same for all the farm types. As far as the data go, the following
generalizations may be made. They all show a nearly static productivity
situation in the early and middle part of the 1950's. Those represented
in the middle and late forties indicate some gain at that time (this is
mainly on tobacco-cotton farms, at a time when cotton productivity
generally was stagnant). Those represented in the early 1960's again
indicate some productivity rise. These are all Kentucky farm types,
combining tobacco production with dairy or beef production, but there
is no clear connection with the productivity trends in those commodities
on other farm types or even on the same ones.
There is hardly a case for curve-fitting in this material. If tobacco
productivity were assumed to represent some variant of the national
agricultural productivity trend at 3.5 percent annual acceleration, then
the tobacco trend would be about 25 years behind the national one
(i.e., the gains made in tobacco productivity from 1940 to 1965 could
be compared to those in national agricultural productivity from 1915
to 1940, or some similar 25-year period).
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Eggs. Aggregated labor productivity data for egg-producing farms
in New Jersey are shown in Figure 9, together with gross productivity
data drawn from the Farm Costs and Returns publication. 3
The aggregated labor productivity trend has been rapid — in fact,
slightly higher than the national trend during the same years. The
3 Broiler farms have been represented in the Farm Costs and Returns series
for only a few years. The data published are too incomplete to allow computation
of aggregated labor productivity (the contributions of the integrators are not
shown). For the same reason, the gross productivity indexes shown in the publica-
tions are not conceptually comparable with those for other farm types (they are
much more net).
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broken line on the diagram shows acceleration at 3.5 percent, but five
years ahead of the national trend (i.e., the egg productivity movement
from 1945 to 1955 was the same as the national agricultural produc-
tivity movement from 1950 to 1960).
The gross productivity trend shows nothing of this. During most
of the period it is almost horizontal, thus exemplifying the inability of
gross productivity measurement to illustrate changes in a highly special-
ized line of production with a large volume of external inputs.
Milk. Data for six types of dairy farms are shown in Figures 10a
and 10b. Three of these farm types are in the Great Lakes states, one
in the Northeast, and two in Kentucky.
The pattern of productivity gain is similar on all six types as far as
the data go. The timing of changes differs considerably from that of
most crop farms. The impact of the depression was smaller than on
most crop farms and the predepression level was soon regained. Sub-
sequent productivity improvement was slow up until the mid-1940's.
Since then improvement has been rapid on all six farm types, precisely
in the period when crop farms were developing slowly and some of
them not at all. On some of the dairy farms, at least, progress appears
somewhat slower in recent years, again in contrast to most of the crop
farms, many of which experienced very rapid productivity gains in the
same years.
All of the dairy farm data could be fitted, with some reservation,
to some variant of the national trend of 3.5-percent annual acceleration,
most of them at approximately a 10-year time lag behind the national
agricultural trend.
Hogs. Productivity data from three hog-producing farm types (all
in the Corn Belt) are shown in Figure 11. They are all rather closely
similar in trend and in trend variation, if at somewhat different abso-
lute levels. The depression dip is somewhat more marked than on the
dairy farms but less so than on most cash crop farms.
There was rather slow productivity development in the early 1940's,
as on the dairy farms, and subsequent more rapid gains in the late part
of the same decade when most crop farms were improving more slowly.
This is noteworthy because these Corn Belt farms have a large crop-
producing component integrated into their livestock production.
All three curves from hog-producing farms could also be fitted to
variants of the function with 3.5-percent annual acceleration, with about
a 10-year lag behind the national agricultural trend.
Beef. Data from three types of cattle ranches are shown in Figure
12a. Productivity indicators from four types of farms producing beef
along with some other commodity are shown in Figure 12b.
Both types of diagrams have two striking features in common: a
rather slow long-term trend of change and wide fluctuations that can
readily be identified as being associated with the "beef cycle." By con-
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trast. the diagrams shown in Figure 12b do not have very much in
common with those for the same farm types on account of their second
< or first i product (compare witli Figures 4b, 8, and 11 i. The only
connection that can be traced directly is in the depth of the depri S
dip on one of the wheat farms, hut this almost coincides in time with
the low point f cycle.
The cycle tops 1944 -45 a! 1.'! 19! .n<\ troughs i around
ind 1959) are more marked on the mixed farm types
(Fig. 12b i than on the ranches (Fig. 12a). The intermountain area
ranches, which are a pure one-product farm type, show the smallest
cyclical variations. The ef-fattening farm type (Corn Belt)
show s -i that is quite that of the northern I
Plains ranches, with one-year's la
Due to the strong cyclical variation, the much weaker long-term
is difficult to measure. The trend from one peak to the next, or
from one trough to the next, would he the only possibility, but the
cycles are so few and are distorted by SO many incidentals, that the
mation becomes very imperfect Most of the ranch and farm types
1928
Productivity in beef production on intermountain beef ranches, northern
Plains beef ranches, and southwestern beef ranches. (5-year averages.)
(Fig. 12a)
show some rise in productivity, however. Some of them could, with
reservations, be fitted to the national trend of 3.5-percent annual accel-
eration, but with a time lag of about 50 years behind the national trend.
Sheep and Wool. Productivity trends for sheep ranches in the
northern Great Plains and in the Southwest are shown in Figures 13a
(for sheep) and 13b (for wool). Divergencies between the two sets of
diagrams are due mainly to variation in the relative prices of the two
closely associated commodities, and to a lesser extent to variation in the
role of different races of sheep with different wool-producing capacity.
In terms of sheep (live weight), all changes up until around 1950
may be no more than a recapturing of the precrisis level of produc-
tivity. Over the last dozen years, productivity gains have been large
and cannot in any way be explained as compensation for previous losses.
In terms of wool, the picture looks more complicated. The pre-
crisis level on the northern Plains was high enough not to be regained
until the mid-1950's, and there have been some gains since then. If
there is a cyclical pattern similar to that of the beef cycle, the present
material may be insufficient to determine the scope of any longer-range
gain.
None of these curves can be fitted to any variant of the national
3.5-percent acceleration trend.
40 Bulletin No. 726 [September,
CD
5 9
UJ 7
or 7
o
§
6u. b
o
or
8 5X
or
UJ
Q.
<n 4
o
z
O
Q.
NORTHERN PLAINS
WHEAT- SMALL GRAIN
LIVESTOCK FARMS
CORN BELT HOG-
BEEF FATTENING
FARMS
KENTUCKY INNER BLUEGRASS
TOBACCO- LIVESTOCK FARMS
^ vJ
NORTHERN PLAINS WHEAT-
ROUGHAGE- LIVESTOCK FARMS
1930 '36 '42 '48 '54 '60
Productivity in beef production on northern Plains wheat-small grain-
livestock farms, northern Plains wheat-roughage-livestock farms, Corn Belt
hog-beef fattening farms, and Kentucky inner bluegrass tobacco-livestock
farms. (5-year averages.) (Fig. 12b)
Summary of Commodity Analyses
Most of the trends are more uneven at the commodity level than at
the aggregate level. This is only what would be expected: in a country
as large and as varied as the United States, many localized trends are
certain to be mutually offsetting.
Nevertheless, several of the commodity trends contain elements
that can also be recognized in the aggregate trend. The continued ac-
celeration through the 1950's is especially clearly reflected in a very
large part of the commodity-level curves.
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Moreover, several of the commodity diagrams can be fitted to
variants of the continuously accelerating function found in the aggre-
gate of United States agriculture. In these cases, productivity gains
can be read as accelerating at a constant acceleration rate of 3.5 per-
cent per year; in most such cases, the commodity trend is either lagging
behind or advancing ahead of the national trend. The rate of 3.5 per-
cent may possibly be interpreted as the rate at which pent-up technolog-
ical gains are released into productive reality (the "storehouse of
knowledge" problem). It may be reasonable to assume that such release
cannot take place at an any too rapid a rate, especially not as long as
the bulk of the commodity or the farm type is still characterized by pre-
viously rational, lower-productive technology.
Be this as it may, there are farm types on which productivity change
is definitely not accelerating and where it may even be interpreted as
decelerating. This is above all true of the Great Plains wheat farms
and could also be true of the Northwest wheat farms after their yield
gains have been cashed in. The same may be true of certain cotton
farm types, namely the most highly productive ones (in California and
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on the Texas high plains). All of these farm types had experienced a
good deal of productivity improvement before the period under study
(wheat) or else productivity was already high when production was
started not too long ago (cotton both in California and on the Texas
high plains).
The slow productivity change in beef production, especially on the
ranches, is possibly indicative of specific obstacles to productivity
improvement, as might be expected in an environment such as
that of the Rocky Mountains, where feed production can hardly be ex-
panded and feed conversion does not improve much either.
It appears from the data analyzed above that productivity in cash
crops has moved along rather similar patterns in the wheat areas,
the Corn Belt, and the cotton areas. Periods of slow and of rapid pro-
ductivity increase roughly coincide in most cases. By contrast, pro-
ductivity in animal husbandry appears rather independent and may
have a pattern of its own. When these differences are aggregated, they
partly offset each other in the national productivity indexes.
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CHANGES IN CAPITAL INTENSITY
The causes of productivity change are many and complex, and any
exhaustive causal analysis would necessitate further work both on con-
ceptualization and measurement. It should be mentioned that the same
event can have several sets of causes, each of which is indispensable in
the sense that if that set of causes failed to materialize, the others
would also be powerless to set off any effect. In the case of productivity
increase, one may point to changes in the input mix as primary causes.
Greater inputs of some of the most efficient factors of production re-
place parts of the less efficient ones which are then withdrawn and used
elsewhere in the economy. Seen from one angle, it is quite feasible, in
principle, to explain all of the productivity changes from changes in
the characteristics and the quantities of production factors employed.
At the same time it is of course true that none of this would happen
unless financial conditions and other practical circumstances made it
feasible for farmers to obtain the improvements in input mix that lead
to higher productivity. Financial feasibility is thus another set of causal
factors that must not be included in the equation together with the
physical inputs, but must be analyzed separately to answer another facet
of the same general complex of problems.
The financial factors are being examined in a separate inquiry. At
present we are most directly concerned with the changes in physical
inputs and how they may explain or at least illustrate the process of
productivity change. Since the present inquiry is concerned with ex-
amining policy problems, the crucial productivity problem is seen as
the relation between capital intensity and productivity. Rather than
attempting any comprehensive causal analysis, this section examines
those changes in capital intensity that can be characterized with the
means at hand.
There is no arguing about the general tendency towards higher
capital intensity in United States agriculture. When measured in con-
stant prices, farmers' expenses for machinery and mechanical power,
fertilizers and lime, and other inputs produced outside the farm sector
have all increased more rapidly than farm output — both over the long
run since 1910 or 1920 and in the shorter run since around 1950. The
incremental capital-to-output ratio of these inputs, although still high
in most cases, is thus declining in physical terms. Conversely, the stock
of productive animals has increased less than the output of animal prod-
ucts. Land has hardly changed at all in aggregate terms.
Along with all this, the input of direct labor (in physical terms)
has been declining at an accelerating rate until the late 1950's and
possibly at a decelerating (but still high) rate since then. Rising ratios
of land, livestock, and externally generated capital per unit of direct
labor are mainly corollary of this change in the use of direct labor. In
a statistical sense these changing ratios might explain much of the
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productivity change, the remainder being explicable by changes in area-
unit crop yields, animal-unit yields of animal products, and changes in
the output mix. But such a statistical explanation would amount to little
more than a reiteration of the story already told. Decline in manpower
and rise in yields are the productivity change; they do not explain it.
What needs explaining are the forces that rendered possible both the
rises in yields and the reduction in the use of direct labor.
When productivity is measured in terms of aggregated labor,
changes in the input mix may be expressed as changes in the propor-
tions between direct and indirect labor. A regression analysis was tried
for three of the dairy-farm types, with only two variables — the ratio
of direct to indirect labor, and a dummy variable for the years 1946-
1953 to account for an abnormally high rate of capital goods acquisi-
tion in those years. On all three farm types, an R2 value close to 0.8
was obtained. 1 Although this might go a long way in explaining the
productivity change (the residual being attributable mainly to yield
changes), it does in fact little more than restate the problem once again.
The ratio of direct to indirect labor is an expression of a whole series
of physical and economic causative factors, but of itself it does not
really explain anything.
The ratio of direct to indirect labor expresses two things: the
large decline in the use of direct labor and the very small increases in
the application of indirect labor due to the rise in productivity in the
factories and offices supplying factors to agriculture. These two things
are, of course, interrelated but to further explore their mutual rela-
tions is not within the scope of this inquiry.
If capital intensity has risen in the sense that each acre and each
worker is associated with more capital, then there is a remarkably stable
relation between capital and output. Table 3 shows a few selected
indicators.
It is easy to note that even the total of all assets has risen at ap-
proximately the same rate as net output. The bulk of the asset value
being in real estate, it is necessary to stress that the area of land used
in agriculture is nearly constant. Changes in real estate values are so
closely tied in with productivity changes that the analysis of capital in-
tensity should be done on capital other than real estate; this is why
column 8 in Table 3 shows the ratio of output to the subtotal of column
6. This ratio falls in the early part of the period shown, then rises
again and reaches a value above that of 1940. But total variation is
slight, with some renewed decline shown by the 1965 figure.
It is also conspicuous that the value of machinery capital has risen
more than capital in general and more than output. Livestock and
other capital (which includes crop and feed inventories and working
capital) have risen at about the same rate as output.
A further step is to ask whether capital intensity has raised the
1 Leunis, op. cit., Chapter 5.
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Table 3.— Production Assets Used in Agriculture at Current Prices on January 1
of Specified Years From 1940 to 1965 and Relation to Gross Output
During the Same Years
Year
1
Farm
real
estate
2
Live-
stock
3
Ma-
chinery Other Total
6
Total
less real
estate
7
Net
output*
8 9
Ratio Ratio
of 6 of 3
over 7 over 7
billions of dollars
1940 27.9 3.9 3.8 2.2 37.7 9.8 8.8 1.11 .43
1945 45.5 8.0 6.9 5.1 65.6 20.1 20.9 0.96 .33
1950 64.6 12.4 11.2 6.7 95.0 30.4 27.7 1.10 .40
1955 85.8 11.0 15.8 7.4 120.0 34.2 27.9 1.23 .57
1960 116.0 15.2 19.2 7.1 157.5 41.5 30.4 1.37 .63
1965 144.3 14.4 20.9 6.6 186.1 41.8 34.9 1.20 .60
a Gross output less interfarm transfers.
Sources: Asset data from "The Balance Sheet of Agriculture." USDA Agricultural Information
Bulletin 290, p. 15. Revised 1965. Production data the same as used in previous sections of this publication.
"real capital ratio" in the sense proposed by Joan Robinson, 2 or in some
related sense. Is the capital associated with one worker now a higher
proportion to that worker's earnings than before? The data in Table 3
suggest the opposite, and this is confirmed by wage data. The index
of composite farm wage rates (USDA), with the 1910-1914 period set
at 100, rose from 131 in 1940 to 366 in 1945, 432 in 1950, 519 in 1955,
and 629 in 1960; in a new index series, with the 1957-1959 period set at
100, 1963 has already advanced nine index points over 1960. In total,
then, the wage level has increased about five times from 1940 to 1963,
which is a greater increase than in the current value of either total farm
production assets, or total assets less real estate, or total net farm out-
put. Only machinery capital has increased in current value somewhat
more rapidly (about 5i/2 times) than did farm wage rates. What all of
this means is that the "real capital ratio" in agriculture has not really
increased— if anything, it has gone down somewhat. But a number of
accounting problems indicate that this conclusion should not be over-
emphasized. Only the ratio of machinery capital to the wage-cost of
labor may have risen somewhat, but probably not very much. 3
At the farm-type and commodity levels the above conclusions can
be made more detailed and more explicit. The ratio of land (as acres)
per worker is an inverted expression of the rate of rural exodus and
the concomitant increase in farm size. Moreover, as noted above, farm-
land value is highly dependent on productivity. Therefore, the current
asset value of farmland and buildings, being already at least in part a
consequence of productivity change, should not be used as a means of
illustrating the capital-intensity aspect of productivity change. In the
2 Joan Robinson, op. cit.
3 Analysis by subperiods would show a more complex pattern, the details of
which cannot be accounted for here.
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analysis of capital intensity by farm types land value was therefore
disregarded. Other capital was further disaggregated into machinery
and equipment, livestock, and crop inventory. 4
This analysis showed that both livestock inventory and crop inven-
tory have a distinct disadvantage as elements of a "real capital" ratio:
their price, too, varies with productivity, although in the opposite
direction as land. Especially in regard to livestock, which is a large
part of all capital on some types of farms, it turned out that the capital
ratio often fell with increasing productivity. This is in a sense logical,
for with the rise in productivity, the unit price of the output— the
animals— should fall. When the output is also a form of capital (in
this case not just "inventory" but also a productive asset in the full
sense of the expression), then evidently the relation easily becomes
paradoxical. Analysis of capital ratios for livestock capital (in current
value terms) as a ratio of the wage cost of a full-time yearly wage
worker was therefore abandoned. Also abandoned was the correspond-
ing analysis of crop inventory capital value for the same reason as in
the case of livestock, and because crop inventories are usually a small
part of all capital.
The analysis was carried through in regard to the capital group
"machinery and equipment." Even when machinery capital was ex-
pressed as a ratio of its current value per man-year of farm work used
to the wage cost of a full-time wage worker, most farm types showed
rather inconclusive curves. The main direction of the curve is hori-
zontal, indicating no change to speak of. Several of the diagrams have
incidental movements up and down, but the net result over the period
under study is that few farm types illustrate any persistent tendency
for the machinery-capital ratio to change with productivity.
The principal exceptions to this rule are the cotton farms. All of
them have a distinct rise in the machinery-capital ratio over the period
under study, and on most of these farms the rise in this ratio follows
a curve quite similar to that of the productivity movement. This even
extends to the California farms with their initial rise around 1950 and
their subsequent slower movement in more recent years.
These peculiarities of the cotton farms reflect two different things.
For one thing, mechanization on cotton farms has been more rapid in
recent years than on most other field-crop farms, and their productivity
improvement has depended more on this rising technical efficiency than
on rising yields. The second, and probably the more important circum-
stance, is the fact that cotton is a subsector where wages are not only
lower than in United States agriculture in general, but also have risen
less than farm wages and farm incomes in other parts of the country.
Therefore the wage cost of a full-time wage worker has not risen
equally with productivity and capital accumulation, and the increasing
assemblage of machines on these farms comes to represent a rising
4 Working capital is not shown in the Costs and Returns publications.
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ratio over the wage cost of labor. The same may be true in regard to
some farm types not covered by the inquiry such as truck farms and
broiler farms.
This may well explain the tendency for machinery capital to have
risen more than the wage index in the country as a whole. It may be
the effect of the wage lag in certain subsectors where labor has had
less alternatives for employment.
In the sense of the "real capital ratio" there has thus hardly been
any change in the degree of capital intensity, except in some subsectors
with peculiar circumstances to explain the deviations. That this is true
while the ratio of indirect to direct labor is rising is another sign of
the rising efficiency of the industries and services supplying agriculture.
This rising efficiency is in fact a principal source of rising aggregated
labor productivity in agriculture.
PRODUCTIVITY AND EARNING POWER
Rising productivity means increased prosperity in the community
where it occurs. More is produced with the same input, the same is
produced with less input, or a rising level of inputs produces output at
a rising rate. Barring any concealed inefficiencies to offset these gains,
these movements should benefit the community. The question is which
of its members benefit the most, or whether the gains are evenly or
unevenly distributed across the community.
In a market economy, without any great manipulation of wage
scales by vested interests, when aggregated labor productivity in agri-
culture rises more than average for the economy, the direct result
should be a reverse movement of the relative prices of the output. If
all industries improved their productivity at the same rate, the relative
prices of their products should remain unchanged. Those industries
that are unable to raise their productivity will have to charge relatively
more for their products, or else reduce their volume of activity, or both.
Conversely, those activities where aggregated labor productivity rises
more than average for the economy will have to lower the relative
prices of their products; otherwise factors would flow in from other
parts of the economy or would fail to leave the activity in question
when they should. The successful industry would then be oversized,
and this would sooner or later reduce the price level of its output.
These tendencies for prices to move in the opposite direction of
productivity can be observed in several of the commodity-level analyses
presented briefly above. The cases of two-product farms with very
different trends for the two commodities are especially telling. The
best examples are perhaps the tobacco-dairy farms in Kentucky.
Such consequences may be partly averted in monopoly or quasi-
monopoly situations, including "closed-shop" wage and employment
rules enforced by labor unions or by other associations representing
some vested interest in a powerful segment of the economy.
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American agriculture does not have many such constraints; in fact,
as has been often repeated, it offers more instances of classic "perfect
competition" than most other parts of the economy. The concurrent
condition of very low demand elasticity for farm products (in the
aggregate) places severe limitations on the room for maneuvering be-
tween prices and volume of activity. 1 Consequently, rising productivity
can be used for market expansion only to a limited extent. Whenever
productivity rises faster than effective demand, resources must leave
agriculture just to maintain the relative earning power of those re-
sources that remain. There is thus unusually little room for maintain-
ing relative prices in excess of what productivity would warrant.
At the same time, price supports have been and are in effect on
certain commodities. Any distorting effect of these supports on the
development of agriculture should become apparent from an analysis of
the interaction between productivity and relative prices.
The concept of relative price used in the following is "unit price
of the commodity as percentage of a per capita national income." This
might also be called the "real price" or the "real-term" or "labor-term"
price. Such a formulation of relative price will express the degree to
which consumers get the commodity cheaper in real terms, i.e., against
less of a sacrifice of their labor earnings. The ratio of labor force to
total population being rather stable in the United States in recent
decades, per capita national income may serve as a proxy for per-
worker product in the national economy.
This concept of relative price may be placed in relation to the
change in productivity. If, for instance, aggregated labor productivity
in dairy farming has doubled over a certain number of years, then a
man-year of aggregated labor produces twice as much milk as before.
If, at the same time, the relative price (in the definition given above)
has fallen to half, then a per capita national income (or any given
fraction thereof) can buy twice as much milk as before. Such a price
development would mean that a man-year of aggregated labor used in
dairy farming still earns the same share of a per capita national income
as before; its relative income position is unchanged. In such a case
the aggregated labor used in dairy farming has received its share of
the national productivity increases at the same time as its own specific
contribution to that productivity increase has been passed on to the
public in general. A change in relative price that was less than inversely
proportional to the rise in productivity of the product in question would
mean that not all of the gain would be passed on to the public. Part
of it would be retained by the aggregated labor used in the product
1 This holds in the aggregate, which is what counts when we are discussing
the affairs of American agriculture as a whole. Some commodities may have
relatively high elasticity coefficients, but others are close to zero in regard to
price and some are even negative in regard to income. As a consequence, the
aggregate has low demand elasticity. The relative ease of transfer of resources
between enterprises within farming makes the effect pervasive.
1967] Productivity of Agricultural Labor 49
and by other factors associated with its production. The reverse would
be true if the relative price were to fall more than in inverse proportion
to the change in productivity.
The relative earning power of aggregated labor expressed in this
way is not too directly related to farmers' incomes. The earning
power relates to all of the aggregated labor and to all other factors,
including land and capital, used for the production of the product in
question. If, for instance, the earnings of agriculture are being
capitalized into land value to a higher degree than previously, then
labor, especially on- farm labor, used for agricultural production may
earn less income increment than indicated by the relation between
productivity improvement and change in relative price. Something
similar may of course also happen in the nonfarm sectors. The indica-
tors about "earning power" thus refer to the trend in income that would
result if factor shares (distribution between land, labor, and capital,
and between subgroups of each) were to remain essentially unchanged
in the distribution of earnings from the commodity in question.
Nevertheless, the relative earning power of labor used for agricul-
tural production is an important indication of the general consequences
of productivity change in the agricultural subsystem— how far these
consequences accrued to the subsystem and how far they filtered
through to the community at large. When this analysis is carried
through to the commodity level, it will also tell something about the
relative success of the several lines of production within agriculture.
Some indications as to the effects of the commodity price support pro-
grams are also likely to emerge.
Figures 14 through 23 illustrate this problem. They show the ratio
of relative price (as defined above) over the inverted productivity
index. Or, expressed more simply, they show the productivity index
multiplied by the relative-price index. 2 The level of each curve indi-
cates the number of hours of aggregated labor needed each year to
generate products to the value of one per capita national income of
the commodity or commodity group in question. The higher the curve,
the lower the level of relative earning power.
The meaning of the various levels of earning power within agricul-
ture may be more easily seen if we first note the average for the national
economy. Since the proportion between labor force and population in
the United States has remained rather stable (close to 40 percent) over
the period under investigation, and since the work year in factories and
offices has been close to 2,000 hours over most of the period since 1930,
it follows that the amount of labor needed, on the average in the
national economy, to produce one per capita national income is about
800 hours.
2 The price is the local price of the state where most of the farm type is
located : i.e., Kansas wheat price for the southern Great Plains wheat farms,
Washington wheat price for Northwest wheat farms, etc.
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In addition to commodity curves, Figure 14 carries a curve for the
whole national agricultural economy for the period since 1919. This
curve shows a rather steady level of from 1,500 to 1,700 hours for
most of the period from 1920 to 1944. The level was lower and
the relative earning power was higher in 1919-20 and again from 1933
to 1936. During the great crisis, agriculture in some sense suffered less
than other parts of the economy, principally because there was no un-
employment. From 1944 to 1947 the level fell abruptly and the earning
power of agriculture improved. Since then it has remained on what
appears to be a new level of from 1,100 to 1,200 hours. The other
figures (15-23) carry the part of the curve for the whole national agri-
cultural economy that pertains to the years in question.
This improvement in the earning power of the agricultural sub-
system in the late war years and the early postwar period could be
explained, in the short run, by war shortages and by the rapid expan-
sion of production that was carried out to meet the needs. Its con-
tinuation in the further postwar period can be explained in part by
the same causes which tended to hold many farm commodity prices
rather high, allowing many farmers to rapidly build up their equipment
and hence their productivity. Continuation after 1950 may in part be
the result of price supports, but it also reflects the changed proportions
of direct and indirect labor in the input aggregate. Since indirect (off-
farm) labor is now a larger share of the total, its higher wage expecta-
tions should have some effect in lowering the number of hours re-
quired to produce a per capita national income worth of farm products
because the relative prices could not fall low enough to reduce the
earnings of factories and offices supplying the farm sector with produc-
tion requisites. However, the share of indirect labor in the aggregate
from 1930 to 1960 rose only from about 16 percent to about 32 percent.
This is not enough to explain all of the improvement in earning power,
unless the wage differential between farm and nonfarm labor were to
have widened in the same period, which is not the case. About half
of the improvement in earning power can be assumed to have gone to
on-farm (direct) labor and factors directly associated with it, such as
land. To this extent, the improvement may very well be the result of
price supports. To what extent this gain stayed with farmers (as
workers) or was passed on to landowners is not clear.
Wheat. Figure 14 shows the relative earning power of aggregated
labor used on three types of wheat farms. The precrisis level
for wheat farms may have been lower than for United States agricul-
ture as a whole. In any event, the Great Plains farms had a level
similar to that of agriculture in general in the late thirties, while the
Northwest farms, because of their rapid productivity improvement
based on rising yields, experienced substantial improvement in this
period. Thereafter, all three wheat farm types improved spectacularly
during the period of wartime and postwar shortages. This improve-
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Rate of return in wheat production: Hours of aggregated labor needed to
produce one per capita national income worth of wheat on northern Plains
wheat-roughage-livestock farms, southern Plains winter wheat farms, and
Washington and Oregon wheat-fallow farms. (Fig. 14)
ment was least striking on the northern Great Plains, where the whole
picture broke down in 1934 and 1936, but these farms have reverted to
the national level in recent years. The southern Great Plains farms and
the Northwest farms have also lost some of the early gains. The North-
west farms have a considerably higher earning power as compared with
the whole national economy. Substantially less than 800 hours are
needed to produce a per capita national income worth of wheat in this
area. They are also ahead of all other farm types represented in this
material, except the California cotton farms (see Figure 16). Even the
cash grain farms in the central Corn Belt (see Figure 15) do not reach
this level. This, of course, is no reflection on relative productivity since
the commodities are not the same; rather it indicates that the Northwest
wheat farms are benefiting from the price support level, which is prin-
cipally geared to areas with lower acre yields, combined with their own
high acre-yield level. The southern Great Plains must similarly be
benefiting substantially from the price support levels; their level of
earning power is also close to that of the central Corn Belt with its high
land productivity. The contrast against the northern Plains is striking
and reminds one that most of the wheat surplus used to come from
the southern Plains.
Corn and soybeans. Figure 15 shows earning power on cash grain
farms in the central Corn Belt. The start of the curve was already
below the contemporary level for agriculture as a whole, and it im-
proved to the level of the national economy (about 800 hours) in the
late thirties. Most of the subsequent improvement in the wartime and
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Rate of return in corn production: Hours of aggregated labor needed to
produce one per capita national income worth of corn on Corn Belt cash
grain farms. (Fig. 15)
postwar years has disappeared, even though the most recent years may
indicate some renewed improvement of aggregated labor earnings in
this area.
In both wheat and corn the improvement in earning power has in
part antedated that of the national trend while in part coinciding with
it and thus contributing to the rather sudden change in the period from
1944 to 1947.
Cotton, Data for seven cotton-producing farms are shown in
Figure 16. The most striking feature of this figure is the wide varia-
tion in earning power between cotton-production areas. Those in
California and the Texas high plains are better than the national agri-
cultural average; those in California are even ahead of the national
economy in general. The Southeast, the delta, and the Texas black
prairie are behind the national agricultural average for all years for
which data are available. The black prairie farms and the large delta
farms (plantations, typified by a 1,000-acre unit) are found, in most
of the postwar period, on the level of 1,500 hours, that characterized
the national agricultural economy previously. But the black prairie
farms required even higher inputs of labor for a per capita national
income previously, as did the southeastern farms. Both of these types
contributed visibly to the general improvement in earning power in the
period from 1944 to 1947. The Texas black prairie farms have con-
tinued to improve in recent years as have also the large delta farms.
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(Fig. 16)
Peanuts. Figure 17 shows data on earning power for peanut-cotton
farms in the southern coastal plains. Like most of the cotton farms
in this area, this farm type has a level of earning power considerably
behind that of agriculture in general. A sharp productivity increase
in recent years is reflected in improvement in the earning-power level
relative to agriculture in general. None of this improvement came in
the period from 1944 to 1947.
Tobacco. Figure 18 shows rates of return in tobacco production for
five tobacco-producing farm types. The rather short period shown
indicates a steady level on each farm type, varying from something
close to the national level on Kentucky tobacco-livestock farms to more
than 2,000 hours on North Carolina costal plains farms. The combina-
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produce one per capita national income worth of peanuts on southern coastal
plains peanut-cotton farms. (Fig. 17)
tion of slow-moving productivity and rather effective price supports
can be assumed to be reflected in these results.
Eggs. The rate of earnings in New Jersey egg farms is shown in
Figure 19. The nearly horizontal line indicates that the very dramatic
gains in aggregated labor productivity have been accompanied by off-
setting declines in the relative price of eggs, maintaining an earning
power well below that of the national agricultural economy but close
to the level that prevailed in United States agriculture prior to 1944.
The low level of earnings in poultry farming is well known, and the
data shown here indicate that most, if not all, of the gains in productiv-
ity have been passed on to consumers.
Milk. Data for four dairy-farm types are shown in Figure 20. The
four farm types are rather close together and rather close to the na-
tional average. Only the Minnesota dairy-hog farms have attained a
level not too far from the national average since the mid-1940's.
All four farm types also followed the general improvement pattern
from 1944 to 1947 rather closely.
The contribution of milk to the national aggregate is large, ex-
ceeded only by beef, and then only in recent years when the beef price
went down less than the milk price. The close association of the milk
curves to the national one is therefore not mere coincidence.
Hogs. Productivity curves for the three hog-producing farm types
are shown in Figure 21. In general, these curves also resemble that of
1967] Productivity of Agricultural Labor 56
or
o
CD
<
-J
Q
Ul
O
UJ
QC
e>
o
<
u.
o
CO
a:
2500
2000
1750
1500
1250
1000
KENTUCKY INTERMEDIATE
BLUEGRASS TOBACCO
-
I DAIRY FARMS
SMALL NORTH CAROLINA
COASTAL PLAIN TOBACCO
FARMS
LARGE NORTH CAROLINA
COASTAL PLAIN TOBACCO-
COTTON FARMS
KENTUCKY OUTER
BLUEGRASS
TOBACCO -DAIRY
FARMS
KENTUCKY INNER BLUEGRASS
TOBACCO - LIVESTOCK FARMS
1940 46 52 *58 '64
Rate of return in tobacco production: Hours of aggregated labor needed
to produce one per capita national income worth of tobacco on small North
Carolina coastal plain tobacco farms, Kentucky intermediate bluegrass
tobacco-dairy farms, large North Carolina coastal plain tobacco-cotton
farms, Kentucky outer bluegrass tobacco-dairy farms, and Kentucky inner
bluegrass tobacco-livestock farms. (Fig. 18)
2000
1500 —
cc 1000
NEW JERSEY POULTRY FARMS
NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL
TREND
1944
Rate of return in egg production: Hours of aggregated labor needed to pro-
duce one per capita national income worth of eggs on New Jersey poultry
farms. (Fig. 19)
56 Bulletin No. 726 [September,
2500
1750 -
1250 -
en
g: 1000
o
•N..
WESTERN WISCONSIN
DAIRY FARMSA/X\ \ DACENTRALNORTHEASTERNIRY FARMS
NATIONAL
AGRICULTURAL TREND
SOUTHERN
MINNESOTA
DAIRY- HOGV—— FARMS
•
--'
EASTERN WISCONSIN
DAIRY FARMS
1929 35 41 47 59
Rate of return in milk production: Hours of aggregated labor needed to
produce one per capita national income worth of milk on western Wisconsin
dairy farms, central northeastern dairy farms, eastern Wisconsin dairy
farms, and southern Minnesota dairy-hog farms. (Fig. 20)
:wu
v ^ NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL TREND
1750 —
\/ \ ^jS CORN BELT HOG -BEEF
N.
X
, /S /X. RAISING FARMS
xOk „•—" "v. \\ / \_/
—
VV N \ \ / CORN BELT\ *VA \ • Z^ HOG- DAIRY
\ ^, \ ^l^X^V^* -*- FARMS
1500
1400
1300
-
1200 -
1100 - v^, Xr^P^ vv
1000
900 \ ..-^ CORN BELT HOG- BEEF\ / FATTENING FARMS800 V
700
1 1 1 1 1
1930 36 42 '48 '54 60
Rate of return in hog production: Hours of aggregated labor needed to pro-
duce one per capita national income worth of hogs on Corn Belt hog-beef
raising farms, Corn Belt hog-dairy farms, and Corn Belt hog-beef fattening
farms. (Fig. 21)
the national agricultural economy as well as those of the dairy farms.
In both commodities, most of the productivity improvement has been
absorbed by reverse movements of relative prices. The proportions
between the levels of the three farm types have remained remarkably
stable.
Beef. Figure 22 shows data from three types of cattle ranches.
Two of these types show rates of earning equal to or better than the
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national average for agriculture. The third one (Southwest) is con-
siderably behind, but then this is the ranch type that showed the lowest
productivity in terms of beef. (See Figure 12a.)
The cattle ranches appear to have received their share in the general
improvement of the earning power of agriculture. This is in contrast
(in appearance only) to the fact that productivity in cattle ranching,
and in beef production generally, has improved only slowly over the
period under study. Again, this means that the relative price of beef
has changed proportionately less than most other prices of agricultural
commodities other than tobacco. The price advantage that has been
passed on to consumers is thus a relatively small one.
There are still visible traces of the beef cycle, although with some
complications. Upswings in productivity are marked by improvements
(downward movements) in the curve for number of hours required to
produce a per capita national income worth of beef. But these counter-
swings are smaller, indicating that part of the variation in productivity,
both up and down, has been absorbed by a reverse movement of prices.
There is some time lag, however, of one or two years between the
variations in productivity and in rates of earning power. This ap-
parently also works out differently on the different ranch types, and the
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Rate of return in cattle ranching: Hours of aggregated labor needed to
produce one per capita national income worth of beef on southwestern cattle
ranches, intermountain cattle ranches, and northern Plains cattle ranches.
(Fig. 22)
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synchronization of movements is much less evident in these curves than
in those on productivity. The intermountain area ranches, on which
the cyclical swings in productivity were the smallest, show the least
connection between these and the variations in rate of earnings.
For this same reason the improvement in rate of earnings in the
1940's is less concentrated in the years from 1944 to 1947 than is the
case with some other commodities. This observation is important be-
cause beef is such a large part of all output. In addition, this reinforces
the hypothesis that the suddenness of the change in the national
level over those few years is in some way connected with the strong
accumulation of machinery and other farm capital just after the
war. This should have relatively little impact on the cattle ranches and
a considerable impact on crop farms and also livestock farms raising
large amounts of stockfeed as field crops.
Sheep and wool. Data from the two types of sheep ranches repre-
sented in the Farm Costs and Returns publications are shown in Figure
23. Both ranch types are relatively close to the general level of the rate
of earnings and with about the same variation. Both also participate
rather clearly in the general improvement occurring just after the war.
Summary of Earnings Rates
The most striking feature in the above analyses is the fact that rela-
tive prices have generally moved in the reverse direction of produc-
tivity, with a remarkable stability in relative earning power on each
farm type as well as in the aggregate as a consequence. In addition,
most farm types have experienced the same relatively rapid improve-
ment in the 1940's as the total for all United States agriculture. Since
part of this improvement goes to indirect labor because of its increased
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share in the aggregate, the stability in the rates of earnings of direct
farm labor and associated on-farm factors is all the more striking.
The main exception to this stability is seen in wheat production.
Even the farms on the northern Great Plains have a much better rate
of relative earning power than before the crisis because the precrisis
level on those farms was rather far behind the general average. For
the southern Plains and the Northwest, it is quite evident that the
continuously high price supports on wheat are the main cause of this,
for the agricultural sector rather favorable, level of earning power.
By inference, we may conclude that wheat is almost the only com-
modity on which price supports have really changed the pattern of
relative earning power. The predominantly horizontal shape of the
curve on most other farm types indicates that these lines of production
have only about maintained the relative levels of earnings which they
had at the start of the period regardless of price supports.
Another noteworthy feature that is a corollary of the preceding
point is that most of the farm types can be rather clearly recognized
as parts of the whole. The longer-term movements are in most cases
parallel to those seen in the curve for agriculture as a whole. Apart
from wheat, the main exception is beef where the beef cycle has had
some influence, making the connection with total agriculture less clear.
This stability in the relative earning power of a man-year of labor
used for agricultural production may at first glance seem rather
puzzling. The rates of earning are sharply different, both between
some commodities and between farm types producing the same com-
modity in different parts of the country and on different types and sizes
of farms. Although farm size may have some influence, it is rather
limited as illustrated by the cotton farms. The largest cotton farms are
by no means the most productive; the most productive are the middle-
sized ones. Location is a more plausible explanation. Despite all mo-
bility of factors, including labor in recent decades, some other things
may be less quick to change. In regard to many farming areas, the first
thing that comes to mind is the concept of "reservation income." In a
given area, farm people have some idea of a minimum income level
below which they would leave farming and seek other employment.
But this level of "reservation income" is clearly not the same in all
areas. This is probably one of the principal reasons why the rate of
earnings of labor in production of the same commodity can be so dif-
ferent in different areas.
Another part of the explanation for such diversity of levels is in
the various rates at which farm earnings go to the land factor. The
highest productivities are usually matched by the highest land-value
levels, whether in the hands of owner-farmers or of landlords, or off
farms or on farms. The areas with the highest levels of land values
are also often those where rates of tenancy are highest. This is why,
for instance, the relative rate of earnings of labor on the cash-grain
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farms of the Corn Belt are not in reality as far ahead of those of hog
producers or dairy farmers in the same area because the latter cate-
gories are owners of their land and livestock to a somewhat higher
degree than the cash grain area farmers. It is significant that differ-
ences in the level of earning power are much less striking among live-
stock farms than among cash crop farms.
This explanation regards mainly the level, and only to a small extent
the direction, of the curve. The apparent stability may reflect still
other, and in part hidden, factors than just "reservation income." The
minor movements up and down may to a great extent reflect incidentals
as well as the medium-term impact of policy; but there may be still
other forces at work that have not yet been discovered or not yet dis-
cussed in proper perspective.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The material presented in this bulletin justifies some reflections on
agricultural policy— past, present, and future. Specifically, the ques-
tion about price and income supports as influencing or not influencing
the pace of progress can in part be answered. The changing structure
of agriculture, as expressed in the composition of the labor aggregate,
will also have some interesting bearings on possible future courses
of action.
On the whole, the analysis does not favor the contention that price
supports and other federal policy measures intended to improve farm
income have stifled progress in agriculture. Over the period under
study productivity has risen more than ever before. This is especially
true of the period since the mid-1930's. That is precisely the period
during which CCC lending and other federal support measures have
been in effect. On this point both the gross and the net productivity
measures warrant the same conclusion. Specific to the aggregated
labor productivity analysis is the finding that the period of price sup-
port measures has been a period in which productivity has grown more
rapidly in agriculture than in the economy as a whole, at least as con-
ventionally measured. If we believe that price supports have stifled
progress, then the implied suggestion is that free markets would have
generated even higher rates of productivity improvement. This is not
very likely because the rates of improvement have been exceedingly
high as it is, both for agriculture as a whole and for most commodities
for which measures have been computed.
If anything, the opposite contention might be true. Perhaps support
measures have actually stimulated productivity improvement. Thus
phrased, the question cannot be answered on the basis of the present
inquiry alone. The problem requires a thorough analysis of the flow
of funds into and out of agriculture, specifically as this flow may have
been affected by the support measures. 1
1 This is the subject of a parallel investigation in progress.
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Whatever the answer to this type of question may be, it is not
necessarily the same for all commodities. The case of wheat may have
the appearance of associating high prices with stagnating productivity.
Such a conclusion would not be well founded, however. On the Great
Plains most of the productivity gains had already been made before
the period under study, but in the Northwest the rapid gain in acre
yields was in no way hampered by price supports. Acreage allotments
may of course have had some of the effects of freezing the land-use
pattern usually attributed to them, thus preventing some of the adjust-
ments which would bring added productivity gains.
The same reasoning might be used in regard to tobacco, even though
it may be less easy to argue that more productive technology would
have played so much larger a part in the absence of price supports and
acreage allotments.
Other supported commodities, such as corn, cotton, and milk, have
contributed their share to the general productivity improvement in
agriculture. By contrast, some unsupported ones, such as beef, have
contributed less to the pace of progress. All of this points to the possi-
bility that any slowdown in productivity development in wheat and
tobacco that may be laid to the price and income supports may very
well have been offset— perhaps even more than offset— by accelerated
productivity improvement in other supported commodities. Whether
the support measures have even promoted this accelerated progress can
not at present be either denied or confirmed.
All of this does not suggest, let alone prove, that the support mea-
sures actually applied were the best that could have been chosen. It is
still possible to argue that some system of more flexible supports con-
ceived over the longer term but applied in response to the year-to-year
situations as they unfolded could have done an even better job of
piloting American agriculture through the phase of unprecedented
productivity growth and structural change that lies behind us.
Looking forward, it is clear that agricultural policies of the future
do not have to be a mere continuation of those of the past. Whether
the effects of support measures on progress have been favorable, un-
favorable, neutral, or a mixture of all these, a future in which produc-
tivity increase can be expected at a decelerating rate rather than the
accelerating rate of the recent past will give reasons to take under
renewed scrutiny the question of whether agriculture needs price and
income supports and, if so, if it needs them more or less than before.
The analysis in this bulletin supports the conclusion that one can
draw directly from the USDA balance sheets: that as the net income
of the farming population becomes a smaller and smaller fraction of
total gross turnover of agriculture, farmers will become increasingly
dependent on stable prices as well as on reduced fluctuations in output.
The scope for maneuvering is being narrowed. The aggregated labor
productivity analysis emphasizes this conclusion by pointing to the fact
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that as indirect labor becomes a larger and larger fraction of the total
labor aggregate, its rather inflexible income expectation puts more rigid
limits to the variations in gross income that farmers can tolerate. If
farmers take a loss on their prices, the factories and offices supplying
agriculture are not willing to take their share of it.
This may point to one of the most significant shifts in agricultural
policy of the future. Gradually, as indirect labor becomes a larger and
larger share of the total, and perhaps one day exceeds direct labor in
absolute quantity, the stress for future productivity improvement will
be on a continued rise in the productivity of those factories and offices
rather than on a continued decline in the direct farm labor force. Pro-
ductivity improvement has really come from them all the time. But it
has been dramatized, and to a large extent made possible, by the exodus
of farm workers. As the farm work force shrinks to the point where
it ceases to be the overwhelming majority of all the aggregated labor
used in agriculture, continued exodus of farm workers will become of
minor importance for continued productivity improvement. Maintain-
ing and raising the productivity of the factories and offices without
raising, and preferably while lowering, the relative prices at which they
offer their output to the farmers will then become the most important
policy problem for agriculture apart from the price and income sup-
ports themselves.
On the other hand, a point will be reached sometime in the not-too-
distant future when farmers are so small a fraction of the total labor
force, and their income expectation represents so small a fraction of
national income, that continued productivity increase in agriculture will
no longer represent such a major contribution to national welfare as it
has up to now. In such a situation income supports and the question of
what level of income farmers are allowed to enjoy will not be much
of a problem for the general public. When farmers are a small corps
of skilled professionals they will have to be granted such incomes as
will attract men and women of the right caliber to the job and keep
them there. The problem about the cost, and thus the productivity
level, of external inputs produced and serviced by factories and offices
can not in the same way be regarded as unimportant beyond a certain
point. These costs will be increasingly critical for the cost at which
agriculture is able to serve the community.
TECHNICAL APPENDIX
The Productivity Measures
Gross productivity is the ratio of all final outputs over all the con-
ventional inputs. Inputs include labor, current production expenses,
depreciation of capital, interest on the stock value of capital, and rent
on real estate. The aggregation of several dissimilar elements renders
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the productivity measure to a high degree dependent upon the price
weights (constant prices) used for expressing the diverse inputs on a
common scale over time, and the classical index-number problem comes
into play to a high degree. This problem is not too important in regard
to agricultural output because the composition of farm output in the
United States has been rather stable for a long time and because the
relative prices of the more important farm products have varied only
moderately in relation to each other. The index of farm output (net
of interfarm transfers of feed, seed, and live animals) can be trusted,
on the whole, both for the gross and for other productivity measures.
The major types of output can be treated separately and in such cases
there is no index-number problem in regard to output.
The input index presents more difficult problems. The "input mix"
(i.e., the array of inputs used and the proportions between them) has
varied considerably over time as new means of production were in-
vented and gained wider application. 1 Along with such changes, and
because of productivity changes within the industries that produce farm
inputs, the relative prices of inputs have also varied far more than is
the case with farm products. The choice of a base period for constant
price weights can thus have a considerable influence on the produc-
tivity index. Since constant prices are used, the measure can not in any
way give expression to rising productivity in the sectors producing ex-
ternal inputs. The most disturbing part of the problem is the pricing
of labor. As productivity rises, less and less labor (in physical terms)
is used together with given quantities of other inputs. Labor therefore
becomes a smaller and smaller part of the total constant-price weighted
aggregate of inputs. At the same time and as a direct consequence of
the rise in productivity in agriculture and other industries the price of
labor goes up in current terms. Whenever, by reason of changing price
relations in general, the base period of the index has to be moved for-
ward, the labor quantity used directly in agriculture at the point in
time where the two indexes based on different sets of price weights are
linked together will become a larger portion of total inputs in the
new index than in the old one. The larger this portion is, the more
productivity and labor earnings have risen. In each period between
linkages, successive reductions in direct farm labor may be smaller in
absolute terms, but these reductions will assume an equally prominent
role as a source of apparent productivity gains in each period between
linkages because the share of direct labor in the total cost bill does not
go down as fast as does labor in physical terms.
In this way, the gross productivity index fails to give expression
to the relation between physical quantities of inputs and outputs. The
1 On these difficulties see V. W. Ruttan, "Agricultural and Nonagricultural
Growth in Output per Unit of Input." Jour. Farm Econ. 39:1566-1576. 1957.
Also see Z. Griliches, "Measuring Inputs in Agriculture : A Critical Survey."
Jour. Farm Econ. 42:1411-1427. 1960.
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fact that price weights have to be varied from time to time makes
the gross measure an economic measure in disguise. In the case of
measuring agricultural productivity, the most serious thing about this
is not that this source of bias is an extreme case of the difficulties
inherent in the index-number problem. Worse still, the difficulty is here
a direct consequence of the change in productivity, that is, of the very
phenomenon that the index should measure and help to explain.
But this is not all. The gross productivity index has another dis-
ability that is at least as serious. The index (the rate of the produc-
tivity change) is often strongly affected by the degree of aggregation
chosen. It so happens that we treat agriculture as one industry. We
might as well treat it as two or more industries; or we might merge it
with forestry and fishing, as is sometimes done. Other industries can
also be treated at a higher or a lower level of aggregation, and the
effects on the index are sometimes profound.
The problem can be illustrated by a fictitious example of an in-
dustry ("industry 1") that may alternatively be treated as two sub-
industries, coded la and lb. The following expressions may be written
for year (the present) and year n (at some unspecified future date) 2 :
Industry Year Year n
100 110
1
Ioo =
100
Too =
110
la ^4=100 S7T=1'050(a) 50(a)
lb
50(a) + 50(b)
= 10°
55(a) + 50(b) =
104 '8
In the specification on two industries, industry lb represents a later
stage in the production of the same goods as la; together they repre-
sent the same turnover as industry 1. The reason why lb shows a
lower productivity rating than 1 and la is found in the fact that when
lb absorbs the entire output of la, this output is now also part of the
input of lb. On the higher level of aggregation, the value added in
the earlier stage of production was treated as internal turnover. The
index shown with industry lb is therefore not comparable with the
index shown with industry 1. The level of aggregation decides which
goods and services will be treated as inputs and outputs and which ones
will be netted out as internal transfers. 3
There are similar examples within agriculture. The input index for
United States agriculture, as computed by the USDA and used by most
of those who discuss productivity in American agriculture, is net of
2 The letters within parentheses indicate the inputs and outputs that are
"internal" to subindustries a and b, respectively.
3 In the same sense, see V. W. Ruttan, "Technological Progress in the Meat-
packing Industry 1919-47." USDA Marketing Research Report 59. January, 1954.
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interfarm transfers (feed, seed, live animals— or rather the "farm-
produced component" of these). Whenever feed crops, seed, and
animal husbandry were treated as separate industries, the interfarm
transfers would become interindustry transfers in the way illustrated
above. Feed crops would be the output of one industry and the input of
another one. Likewise, ranching and feedlot operation could also be
treated as separate industries, with further effects on the productivity
index. Generally, the lower the level of aggregation, the lower the pro-
ductivity index, as illustrated by the example above. The USDA Farm
Costs and Returns publications, which are used as sources of com-
modity-level data in this publication, can give instructive examples of
this principle. For instance, the egg farms in New Jersey are shown to
have a very low index of gross productivity despite the fact that it is
common knowledge that the poultry industries have absorbed large
amounts of new technology in a short time. 4 The reason for the low
index for egg farms is that the egg industry is a very specialized opera-
tion in which the ratio of external to internal inputs is very high and
thus the consequences of disaggregation are unusually large. These
gross farm-level and commodity-level indexes are therefore, in a very
elementary sense, not comparable between themselves.
This property of the gross productivity index — that indexes on dif-
ferent levels of aggregation and for subindustries on different levels of
functional specialization can not be compared between themselves —
also has consequences for the use of the gross index at the national
level. When the index for agriculture is not comparable with the indexes
for its subindustries, then it is also not comparable with any index for
the whole national economy. National income or product, however
defined, is always "net" in the sense that interindustry transfers have
been netted out. On the level of the whole national economy, there is
no longer any choice between levels of aggregation; there is only one
level — the comprehensive one. And this level is as little comparable
with an industry-level aggregation (e.g., agriculture) as the latter is
with its subindustries. This is the reason behind the often-repeated and
fallacious statements about productivity increase in agriculture being
slower than in the national economy as a whole. 5
The same problem of level of aggregation also disturbs the validity
of gross productivity as a measure over time. In the case of agricul-
ture, it is easy to show that the degree of comprehensiveness has
changed over time (e.g., when feed mixing became an external input,
or draft power, for that matter). The gross index thus can not be
taken to express the same things over the long run.
4 See Figure 9 on page 35 and Figure 5 on page 30.
5 Thus, for instance, see R. A. Loomis and G. T. Barton, "Productivity in
Agriculture, United States, 1870-1958." USDA Technical Bulletin No. 1238.
April, 1961. On page 1 of this publication it is said that productivity increased
slower in agriculture than in the economy as a whole, even over the period from
1940 to 1957.
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The origin of gross productivity measurement is in the needs of
short-run forecasting, a situation where constant prices are often
postulated for want of anything more informative. Gross productivity
measurement has some usefulness in situations of this type, and gener-
ally for short-run and especially firm-level analyses where input mix
and relative prices of both inputs and outputs have changed but little.
For long-run analyses, and for comparison between essentially different
production aggregates, gross productivity analysis is likely to produce
more illusions than illumination.
Net productivity measurement shares some of the disabilities of
gross measurement, but not all of them. The difficulties associated with
the index-number problem are essentially the same as described above.
The splitting up of production factors into "internal" and "external"
adds some complications to the index-number problem, and the concept
of "value added" is even more difficult to accept as a "physical"
measure than in the case of the aggregates of total price-weighted out-
put. On the other hand, there is no problem here about the level of
aggregation. All interindustry transfers are treated as "external" in-
puts. In the fictitious example above, industry lb would have the
following equation:
Year Year n
50(b) ;>0(b)
Hence the indexes for subindustries a and b can be freely aggregated
to industry 1 and all the various industries can be treated as com-
ponents of the national economy. The index of net productivity for
agriculture or for any of its parts is therefore in principle directly
comparable with that for the national economy.
At the same time, net productivity accounts for only part of what
goes on within agriculture. It is a partial index, not a comprehensive
one, and the output that it treats is value added, a quantity con-
siderably smaller than total agricultural output. To find the rationale
for the whole process of agricultural change, and its meaning for the
national economy, one should also investigate the industries that
supply agriculture with the goods and services commonly referred to as
agriculture's external inputs.
This logically leads to a search for a productivity measure that is
related to the entire output of agriculture and yet lacks some of the
disabilities of the gross productivity measurement. The aggregated
labor productivity measure meets most of the specifications. At the same
time it leaves unsolved certain problems which are at least clearly
stated rather than ignored. In this analysis, agriculture, together with
those parts of other industries that produce and service farm production
requisites, is treated as a subsystem of the national economic system.
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Computation of the Aggregated Labor Productivity Index
Aggregated labor is the sum of labor used directly on farms and
labor used indirectly, that is, used to produce and service farm produc-
tion requisites. These requisites include both durable goods such as
buildings, machines, implements, as well as repair and upkeep on these,
and current inputs such as chemicals, seeds, live animals, feed mixing,
and custom work. Durable goods can be treated either on the basis of
their annual depreciation (as in the USDA data) or on the basis of
annual acquisitions regarded as depreciated to zero in the same year
because the conventional depreciation schedules are controversial. 6 This
choice of statistical treatment makes some difference in the short-run
variations of the index, but almost none in the long run. For the present
study, depreciation was used in the year-to-year series for the total of
United States agriculture, while annual acquisitions were used in the
analysis of input-output tables and also in the commodity-level analyses.
Both current production expenses, including upkeep and repair, and
costs of capital goods, whether by depreciation or acquisition value, are
represented by their current value year by year. The costs of acquiring
feed, seed, and live animals were divided into a farm and a nonfarm
portion according to coefficients used by the USDA. The nonfarm
(mainly service) component was 45 percent for feed bought, 47 percent
for seed bought, and 10 percent for live animals bought. The farm
portion was netted out in the calculations for total United States agri-
culture. In the commodity-level calculations, by contrast, estimates of
its farm and nonfarm labor components were added to the data for
direct farm labor on the farm type concerned.
The annual total of external costs was converted into estimates of
nonfarm labor use by two parallel procedures. One way was to reduce
this dollar amount to the current year's characteristic "labor share"
in the nonagricultural part of the national product and then divide by
the year's average industrial hourly wage. The other way was to compute
the sum of external costs as a percentage of the year's nonagricultural
national product, and then apply the same percentage to the nonagri-
cultural part of the labor force. The former procedure yielded data in
man-hours, the latter in man-years. They can be compared by means of
available information about the average length of the work week in
factories separately for each year. On the whole, the two data series
generated in these ways are in good agreement. This provides a check
on the accuracy of the computation. 7
6 On the difficulty of depreciation scales, see Z. Griliches, op. cit.
7 The shortcut procedures were first proposed in F. Dovring, "Labor Used for
Agricultural Production." University of Illinois Department of Agricultural
Economics AERR-62. 1963. Applications to three European countries are dis-
cussed in Output, Expenses and Income of Agriculture in European Countries,
Series 5. Notes on method, pp. 173-175. United Nations, Geneva. 1965.
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The shortcut procedures described above imply an assumption as to
the character of the goods and services that agriculture buys from
other sectors of the economy. These goods and services are assumed to
represent a true cross-section of the nonagricultural economy as regards
the distributive shares (part of the product going to labor) and also as
regards the wage scales (the mix of higher- and lower-paid labor).
This assumption was tested through analysis of input-output tables,
as described in detail elsewhere. 8 The productivity indicators coming
out of this analysis are slightly more comprehensive than those from
the shortcut method, inasmuch as they also include the effect of certain
"final" agricultural products coming back to agriculture as parts of pro-
duction requisites. This includes certain cotton and wool fabrics. This
difference is slight in practice, however. Agreement with the results of
the shortcut methods is close and leaves no doubt that the amounts of
indirect labor have been computed with as much accuracy as the present
purpose will require.
The input of direct (on-farm) labor has been borrowed from annual
USDA data on labor input in agriculture. These data are expressed in
man-hours. Where necessary, they were converted into man-years of
direct labor on the basis of 2,400 hours of labor to a year of agricul-
tural work; no indications were available to allow any precise observa-
tions on the actual variation in time or space in the length of the work
year in farming.
The USDA estimates of labor use are based on labor efficiency
norms that reflect average actual performance rather than peak-level
efficiency. When converted into man-years, they yield figures that are
not far removed from the decennial census data on numbers of workers
employed principally in agriculture. This should approximate the num-
ber of labor years actually used because part-time employment should
balance approximately between those who are mainly agricultural work-
ers and those who are mainly nonagricultural workers. Some amount of
disguised underemployment is thus included in the data, and produc-
tivity is in no way exaggerated.
The sum of direct and indirect labor, as described above, or its
index-number representation, is the denominator in the productivity
expression; the numerator is the sum of output for final use, including
the portion reserved for direct human consumption on the farm where
produced, or its index-number representation.
The estimate of aggregated labor is based on year-to-year data
and price relations without any use of constant prices. It is not a
8 Detailed analyses in W. F. Gossling, "A New Economic Model of Structural
Change in U.S. Agriculture and Supporting Industries." Unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, University of Illinois. 1964. Summary of findings, including mathematical
comparison between the shortcut method and the matrix solutions, in W. Gossling
and F. Dovring, "Labor Productivity Measurement: The Use of Subsystems in
the Interindustry Approach, and Some Approximating Alternatives." Jour. Farm
Econ. 48 -.369-377. 1966.
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conversion in the sense of constant-price calculations; it is an estimate
of actually existing quantities. 9 The index-number problem is confined
to the output index and it is, as already mentioned, of moderate pro-
portions. The index of aggregated labor productivity reflects, as
accurately as can be done at present, the share of the nation's labor
force that is used for agricultural production either directly on farms
or indirectly in factories, offices, and other nonfarm places of work to
produce the country's agricultural output for final use. In this way the
index is comparable with the relatively simple concept of national prod-
uct per worker in the whole economy. Here the index-number problem
is also confined to the output side. It is also, with some further reserve,
comparable with the still somewhat simpler concept of per capita
national income. The new index is comprehensive in regard to the use
of the nation's resources of human labor. There are errors, and there
are some omissions, but neither are of great magnitude.
The Data Used
Farm output, as used for the aggregate-level index, is the same as
used by the USDA for gross productivity measurement. For years
after 1957, the output quantities were computed by the same treatment
of annual data from the annual USDA Agricultural Statistics. Gross
production of crop and animal products was reduced by the amounts
of interfarm transfers of seed, feed, and live animals. The amounts
of farmers' purchases of these items, reduced by certain coefficients
applied by the USDA to separate the farm-produced from the service-
and-processing components, were subtracted from the total of crop and
livestock production. The farm-produced fractions were assumed to be
53 percent for seed, 55 percent for feed, and 90 percent for live
animals, the balance being processing and transportation costs, handling
charges, etc. These off-farm produced amounts were added to the total
of off-farm produced production inputs. For the graphic representa-
tion, the output quantities at constant prices, rather than the index,
were used.
For inputs, farm labor data from the annual USDA series on labor
required on farms were used. The indirect labor was computed from
the sum of expenses for fertilizer and lime, repairs and operation of
capital items, depreciation and other consumption of farm capital, and
miscellaneous expenses, plus the off-farm produced components of seed,
feed, and livestock purchased. A specimen of the computation is shown
in Appendix Table 1. This variant of the computation was modified
for use in Figures 1, 2, and 3 by assuming a standard work year of
2,400 hours in agriculture for the whole period.
9 A particular problem which is sometimes discussed in this connection is
that of "dated labor" or expenditures made in the past. This is not a real prob-
lem, however, since the same products could always be obtained out of current
production. See J. Horring, op. cit., pp. 23 sq.
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Note that in the Gossling index based on input-output tables capital
goods are represented by annual purchases rather than by depreciation.
The same is the case in the commodity-level analyses, based on the
Farm Costs and Returns publications.
Commodity-Level Analyses
The costs-and-returns data up to 1957 were taken from the con-
solidated publication with revised data for the whole period, 10 while
those for subsequent years were added, to the extent that the farm types
continued to be identical. There are a few exceptions in recent years.
The costs-and-returns data are to a great extent estimates by inter-
polation between bench mark years, using various statistical sources in
support. The data are therefore not as accurate as if a sample of farms
had been covered by continuous observation year after year. Never-
theless the information appears sufficiently precise to be used for the
kind of generalizations offered in this bulletin.
In computing these indexes, a special treatment was needed in regard
to purchased feed, seed, and livestock. 11 The nonfarm component of
these inputs was computed in the same way as the national index,
but the farm-produced component could not be netted out unless the
aggregated labor productivity concept were to lose its comprehensive-
ness with regard to specific products, above all those of animal
husbandry.
In principle, the farm-produced components of these farm inputs
are the products of the specific farm types where they were produced,
and the aggregated labor used to produce them should have been com-
puted on the basis of the input mix on those farm types. In practice
it was not possible to trace these products down to the farm types from
which they came, and their farm-gate value (in dollars) was therefore
divided in equal parts between direct (on-farm) and indirect (off-
farm) labor. The margin of error that this procedure sometimes intro-
duces becomes part of a small component of the entire amount of ag-
gregated labor and is therefore, in practice, negligible.
The amounts of farm and nonfarm labor computed for the farm-
produced components of feed, seed, and live animals were added to
those directly pertaining to the farm types on which these farm-
produced inputs were used. Thus, for instance, the aggregated labor
used to produce eggs on a New Jersey poultry farm, or the beef on a
beef-fattening operation in the Corn Belt, includes the quantities of
both farm and nonfarm labor used on other farms to produce feed
crops and animal stock as well as the nonfarm inputs needed to bring
10 W. D. Goodsell and I. Jenkins, "Costs and Returns on Commercial Farms,
Long-Term Study 1930-57." USDA Statistical Bulletin 297.
11 For details, see Leunis, op. cit., Chapter 3. An example is shown in Ap-
pendix Table 1.
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these farm-produced inputs from the producing farm to the farm on
which they are used as inputs. A specimen of this computation is shown
in Appendix Table 2.
As a test upon the accuracy and reasonableness of the productivity
indexes thus calculated for each of several major commodities, these
indexes were aggregated back to the total of the United States agricul-
ture. 12 Summarized results are shown in Figure 3. The commodities
covered by the commodity-level indexes represent a large part— about
75 percent— of all farm commodities produced in the country, and a
somewhat smaller proportion of all farms in the country. Treating them
as a sample of such percentage as they represent in each year (for
example, 75 percent) may not sound too bold at first, but it does en-
tail certain problems. Horticultural crops, which are totally absent
from coverage in these indexes, are known to have a rather untypical
productivity history (their main contribution to the national index is
in recent years). Noncommercial farms may also have disappeared
more rapidly during the 1950's than before. Another difficulty lies in
the treatment of capital goods. In the farm-type data as well as in the
matrix data for certain years acquisition of durable goods for invest-
ment has been treated as current expenditure, as if depreciation equaled
acquisition in each year, while the year-to-year aggregate data use the
conventional depreciation schedules applied by the USDA. This feature
should exaggerate the use of nonfarm labor in years when accumulation
exceeds depreciation, as happened especially in the late 1940's, and vice
versa, e.g., in part of the 1950's.
12 For details of procedure, see J. V. Leunis, op. cit., pp. 28-38. Subsequently,
the procedure has been applied to the entire time series from 1930 to 1964, using
alternatively only the commodities represented by the farm-type series beginning
in 1930 and all the commodities represented also by later farm-type series.
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Appendix Table 1.— Specimen Computations of Dovring Indexes
(In the Aggregate)
Item r*„»,«.:«+;«„ Year
No.
Description
196Q
1-11 Unweighted and weighted producer's expenditures
in millions of dollars
1 Fertilizer and lime 1 ,463
2 Repairs and operation of capital items 3 ,986
3 Depreciation and other farm capital consumption 4, 144
4 Feed purchased 4 , 848
5 Livestock purchased 2 , 508
6 Seed purchased 538
7 (4) X 0.45 2,182
8 (5) X 0.10 251
9 (6) X 0.47 253
10 Miscellaneous 2,728
11 Sum of items 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, and 10. 15,007
11a Nonagricultural national income, billions of dollars 400.5
lib Labor's share of item 11a, billions of dollars 290.8
lie (lib) divided by (11a) 72609
12 (11) X (lie), millions of dollars. 10,896
13 Average hourly wage in manufacturing, production workers,
dollars 2 . 26
14 (12) divided by (13), millions of man-hours 4,821
15 Millions of man-hours worked in agriculture 9,825
16 (14) + (15), millions of man-hours 14,646
17 USDA index of total agricultural output (1957-1959 = 100) 106
18 (16) to base (1957-1959 = 100) 94.95
19 (17) divided by (18), Dovring Index 1 111.64
20 (11) divided by (11a) 037471
21 Nonagricultural employment, thousands 54,347
22 (21) X (20) 2,036
23 (22) X 52 105 ,872
24 Average weekly hours in manufacturing, production workers. ... 39.
7
25 (23) X (24), millions of man-hours 4,203
26 (15) + (25), millions of man-hours 14,028
27 (26) to base (1957-1959 = 100) 94.38
28 (17) divided by (27), Dovring Index II (man-hour variant) 112.31
29 Persons engaged in agriculture, full-time equivalents 5,434
30 (29)
-f (22) 7 ,470
31 (30) to base (1957-1959 = 100) 95.71
32 (17) divided by (31), Dovring Index II (man-year variant) 110.75
Source: Gossling, op. cit., p. 247.
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Appendix Table 2.— Specimen Computations of Aggregated Labor
Productivity at the Farm-Type Level on Dairy Farms
in Western Wisconsin
Item
No.
Description 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934
1 Total cash receipts, dollars 1 ,583
2 Value of perquisites, dollars 455
3 Change in inventory of crops and livestock, dollars 35
4 Gross production (1) + (2) + (3), dollars 2,073
5 Government payments, dollars
6 Output (4) - (5), dollars 2,073
7 55 percent of total feed purchased, dollars 103
8 Farm labor (half of (7) converted by assumed farm
labor wage), hours 206
9 Nonfarm labor (half of (7) converted by assumed
nonfarm labor wage), hours 103
10 45 percent of total feed purchased, dollars 84
11 Nonfarm labor ((10) converted by assumed non-
farm labor wage), hours 153
12 90 percent of total livestock purchased, dollars .... 13
13 Farm labor (half of (12) converted by assumed
farm labor wage), hours 26
14 Nonfarm labor (half of (12) converted by assumed
nonfarm labor wage), hours 13
15 10 percent of total livestock purchased, dollars .... 1
16 Nonfarm labor ((15) converted by assumed non-
farm labor wage), hours 2
17 Nonfarm expenses, dollars 551
18 Nonfarm labor ((17) converted by assumed non-
farm labor wage), hours 1 ,001 937 820 755 734
19 Total nonfarm labor (9) + (ll) + (14) + (16) + (18),
hours 1,272 1,190 1,128 1,166 1,260
20 Labor share as a percentage of nonagricultural
national income 65 .
7
21 Total nonfarm labor (19) X (20), hours 836
22 Total farm labor (8) + (13) + labor used on each
farm type, hours 5,012
23 Total labor (21) + (22), hours 5,848
24 Physical output ((6) divided by price received by
farmers for leading commodity (100 pounds of
milk)), dollars 1,280
25 Accumulated labor production (24) divided by (23) .219
1,149
348
-135
1,362
1,362
83
801
290
25
1,116
1,116
78
831
296
-51
1,076
3
1,073
95
1,005
303
-217
1,091
49
1,042
154
218 300 432 542
109
67
150
63
216
78
271
126
131
9
143
7
177
7
238
8
23 27 32 31
11
1
13
1
16
1
15
1
2
478
2
361
2
332
2
389
70.8
843
77.6
875
79.4
926
75.2
948
5,121
5,964
5,127
6,002
5,234
6,160
5,193
6,141
1,184
.199
1,254
.209
1,095
.178
956
.156
Source: Adapted from J. V. Leunis, op. cit., p. 21.
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